From: Ralph McGehee Newsgroups: alt.conspiracy Subject: Deadly Deceits Message-ID: Date: Tue, 01 Apr 1997 12:56:09 -0800 (PST) /* Written 12:55 PM Apr 1, 1997 by rmcgehee in igc:alt.pol.org.ci */ /* ---------- "Deadly Deceits" ---------- */ "The CIA is not now nor has ever been a central intel agency. It is the Covert action arm of the president's foreign policy advisers. In that Capacity it overthrows or supports foreign gvts while reporting "Intelligence" justifying those activities. It shapes its intelligence, Even in such critical areas as soviet nuclear weapon capability, to support Presidential policy. Disinformation is a large part of its covert action Responsibility, and the american people are the primary target audience of Its lies." mcgehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 192 The immediately below portion is from Wade Frazier's website. Below that are excerpts from Deadly Deceits. Deadly Deceits - My 25 Years in the CIA, 231, Ralph McGehee, Sheridan Square Press, 1983. Ralph McGehee's Deadly Deceits has become a textbook in some college classes. It is a tale that starts slowly and builds to an epiphany of realization. During McGehee's twenty-five year CIA career he heartily believed in its stated mission of "fighting communism." And as McGehee writes, CIA candidates are psychologically screened before hired, and one of the most treasured qualities of a CIA candidate is the willingness to follow orders without questions and to not think too much about it. Ralph W. McGehee joined the CIA in 1952 after being a star football player at Notre Dame (Where Phil Agee studied also.) during their national championship years. He was raised on and believed in the American dream - "the Protestant work ethic, truth, justice, freedom." He signed on as a dedicated cold warrior. He spent the next ten years stationed at home and abroad: at Langley (the CIA headquarters in Washington), Taiwan, Japan, the Phillipines, and then Thailand. McGehee was dedicated to stopping the scourge of communism, and enthusiastically did his part to keep the world free of its taint. In the mid 1960s Thailand was right next to the other Southeast Asian nations of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, and communism was sweeping the land. McGehee's job was to save Thai villages from communist insurgency. He stumbled upon an innovative way to bust communist cells in the villages, sort of torching the grass roots. They found a method of intelligence gathering (basically intelligent intimidation of villagers) that identified communists and exposed their network. The results of their methodology created a stir in the intelligence circles in 1967, and accolades and awards came in. McGehee had the biggest success of his 15 year career, he had found a way to expose the communists, and his future in intelligence looked very bright. Just then William Colby (future CIA head, and then Far East division chief) came to visit him, and McGehee briefed him on what he had learned: "I explained the procedures of the survey and then outlined my general conclusions, including my doubts about previous Agency reporting which said that the Communists did not have the support of the local people and that they forced people to support them with threats and terrorism. "Such a picture is inaccurate," I told Colby..."We have found that the Communists concentrate the majority, almost the entirety, of their time winning the cooperation of the peasants." McGehee had exposed the Communist movement as a grass roots movement that had the support of the peasants, mainly because the Communist goals were to throw off the shackles of Imperialism, enforced by the Thai ruling class and their industrialized-nation sponsors, and live freely. McGehee had shown fairly undeniably that Communism in Southeast Asia was a mass movement that had the support of the people. McGehee was extremely puzzled by Colby's response, "We always seem to be losing." McGehee was eager to flush out all those communists with his successful interrogation method, but soon after Colby's visit McGehee was taken out of the field, his successful program canceled, and he was put behind a meaningless desk at Langley. He didn't know what had happened, and it took him years to figure it out. It turned out that he had come up with the wrong answer in Thailand. Communism couldn't be damned as an evil if the people themselves were in favor of it. If that fact became known, what we were doing in Vietnam wouldn't look too good: killing millions of people to keep them from choosing a way of life we didn't approve of. McGehee still fervently believed the propaganda he had been steeped in, and volunteered to go to Saigon. His experience there beat out all of the illusions he had been raised with. He saw the naked, insane evil of what the United States was doing, and it almost ruined him. Visions of napalmed children and cratered fields were seared into his brain. At one point he had thought of killing himself to protest what the CIA was doing, but in the end he committed himself to exposing what the CIA was doing. As he left Vietnam: "I was glad to be going home. But I knew I would never be the same person again. All of my ideals of helping people, all my convictions about the processes of intelligence, all my respect for my work, all the feelings of joy in my life, all my concepts of honor, integrity, trust and love, all in fact that made me what I was, had died in Vietnam. Through its blindness and its murders, the Agency had stolen my life and my soul. Full of anger, hatred, and fear, I bitterly contemplated a dismal future." McGehee had by that time put in almost 20 years with the CIA. He spent the last several years of his career at Langley getting educated in the CIA archives. He retired after he got his 25 years in and accepted a career achievement medal, partly so his future work couldn't be called the work of a CIA person with a failed career. He began his book's conclusion with: "The CIA is not now nor has it ever been a central intelligence agency. It is the covert action arm of the President's foreign policy advisers. In that capacity it overthrows or supports foreign governments while reporting "intelligence" justifying those activities (McGehee says he has never once seen a CIA official tell the truth to Congress. Instead comes a steady stream of lies.). It shapes its intelligence, even in such critical areas as Soviet nuclear weapon capability, to support presidential policy. Disinformation is a large part of its covert action responsibility, and the American people are the primary target of its lies. "As noted in the Church Committee's final report, the Agency's task is to develop an international anti-communist ideology. The CIA then links every egalitarian (which means "all men are created equal" - ed.) political movement to the scourge of international communism. This then prepares the American people and many in the world community for the second stage, the destruction of those movements. For egalitarianism is the enemy and it must not be allowed to exist." McGehee calls for the abolition of the CIA. But the big reason I am citing McGehee's book here is because of what he had to go through to get his book published. He didn't want to lose his pension, go to jail, or leave the country, so he had to abide by the secrecy agreement he signed when he joined the CIA. In the book's appendix he tells the surreal adventures he went through to get the book published. The appendix begins: "The secrecy agreement that I signed when I joined the CIA allows the Agency to review prior to publication all writings of present and former employees to ensure that classified information relating to national security is not revealed. This provision seems logical and necessary to protect legitimate interests. However, my experiences in getting this book approved show that the CIA uses the agreement not so much to protect national security as to prevent revelations and criticisms of its immoral, illegal, and ineffective operations. To that end it uses all possible maneuvers, legal and illegal. Had I not been represented by my attorney, Mark Lynch of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and had I not developed a massive catalog of information already cleared by the Agency's publication review board, this book could not have been published." McGehee then recounts what he went through. I can't do justice to what he went through, it has to be read to be believed. The CIA first tried ambushing him with a room full of lawyers, until they knew he had already obtained a lawyer with the security clearance to represent him in those matters. Then the CIA man assigned to work with him on the review set the tone early in the process: "It's too bad you didn't work for the Israeli intelligence service. They know how to deal with people like you. They'd take you out and shoot you." McGehee's original manuscript contained nothing that he felt was classified information, and he was very careful about it. The CIA made 397 deletions out of his first text, and that was after they had retracted hundreds of their more whimsical deletions, before they knew McGehee had obtained competent counsel. The battle took over two years, and the CIA went around and around in circles. You have likely never seen such double-talk in your life. First they would permit certain passages after battling with McGehee, then they would retract that permission, then back again, on different grounds each time. At one point he was threatened with prosecution for stealing state secrets if he couldn't prove every fact in his book was obtained in the public domain. The final book is riddled with censorship deletions, like "[19 words deleted]" in the middle of a sentence. McGehee states: "John Marks and Victor Marchetti's book The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, published in 1974 (9 years before McGehee's book), was the last approved critical book written about the Agency by an ex-employee. In light of my own experiences the reason is obvious: the secrecy agreement and the way it is abused by the Agency. It is virtually impossible to write in an atmosphere where everything is secret until it is deemed otherwise....It is clear that the secrecy agreement does not halt the flow of information to our enemies, for it does not affect the CIA employee who sells information...What the CIA's secrecy agreement does quite effectively, however, is to stop critics of the Agency from explaining to the American public what the CIA is and does. It is sad to say, but the truth is that the primary purpose of the secrecy agreement is to suppress information that the American people are legitimately entitled to." And the McGehee goes on to warn that the Reagan administration was making even more moves to clamp the lid of secrecy on the government's activities. The gutting of Carter's Freedom of Information Act was one of the big undertakings of the Reagan/Bush administrations, amply documented in the independent press. Excerpts from Deadly Deceits China China, circa 71-74 U.S. Rapproachement with China and increased chinese Anti-Sovietism caused problems for CIA China ops. CIA had long seen China As a principal adversary. As result of contradiction, China desk simply Ignored or suppressed intel that painted China in good light. Early 70's CIA obtained chinese document on long range policy re continents and short Range policy re individual countries. Report indicated China planned to act In way parallel to U.S. Goals. Amazingly, document not recommended for Dissemination. Our operational warriors realized that if they disseminated The report, it might stimulate some gvt leaders to question CIA's Insistence that China be on the top of its operational target list. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 120-1 Counterinsurgency Malaya, circa 55-59 As part of CI op against cpm british gathered intel By use of locked, steel mailbox placed in problem villages. People dropped Anonymous tips about commie activity which then analyzed. Mailbox method Was basis for more thorough CI ops in thailand. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 99 Thailand. CIA CI ops in thailand used blend of interrogation, intimidation, And pro-gvt propaganda. Thai offiCIAls would come into villages and speak Of commie threat. Thai officers would conduct individual interviews with All villagers, looking for signs of commie influences and asking for info On neighbors. CIA/thai forces would analyze responses and, based on Contradictions or suspicious info, conduct second battery of interrogation Hoping to get confessions from commies. Sometimes, psy-terror employed in Interviews. One instance, gun held to baby's head in presence of mother. In Another assassination of a suspect's father was feigned to prompt Confession. Thai CI op overall successful in stemming commie spread and Breaking up existing network. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 102-06 Thailand. Circa 63 CIA tried establish close ties with minority hill Tribes and lessen their vulnerability to commie subversion. Part of CI Program included training hill people in medicine and advanced agricultural Methods and providing them breeding stock. CIA also built landing strips Which facilitated military ops. Eventually, because of commie infiltration Near Laotian border, hill villages were shelled and napalmed by thais. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 76-80 Covert a Southeast asia. Major CIA op was building army of hmong hill tribesmen to Fight communist pathet Lao. Apparently CIA could not convince Laotians to Fight so it relied on minority group with many activities co-ordinated by Thailand's police aerial reconnaissance units. As in Vietnam the CIA Refused to acknowledge the real nature of the communist pathet Lao. Through Paru and the hmong it developed an army loyal to the U.S. And dependent on The CIA. But without a commitment by the Laotians, the CIA's private army Finally succumbed to the reality of the overwhelmingly superior pathet Lao Forces. The hmong who cooperated with the CIA are now a dying tribe. The War destroyed their young men. Remnants of their tribe now live an Impoverished, uncertain existence in refugee camps in thailand. McGehee, R.w. (1983). Deadly Deceits 169 Deception Thailand, 65 CIA officer allegedly had vital agent infiltrator into thai Comm party who had organized splinter group dedicated to peaceful change. Case officer given medal of intel for this op. However when his safely Guarded files (restricted on basis of "need to know" policy) were opened, New case officer found op largely a bluff, cancelled the op, and dropped Agent. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 91 Thailand, 73 CIA sent a forged letter allegedly from cpt to prime Minister containing insulting offer of cease-fire in exchange for autonomy Of "liberated" areas.initially, letter had intended effect of inciting pm To condemn communists. However, journalist traced letter to CIA station in Sakorn nakorn creating barrage of anti-CIA editorials in press and Anti-U.S. Demonstrations. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 167-8 Intel f Thailand, circa 65 CIA estimated 2,500-4,000 cpt in all of thailand. Ci Team led by mcgehee estimated by end of extensive intel op that there might Be that many cpt in sakorn nakorn province alone. Further intel initiates Indicated that extensive commie infiltration was probably taking place in 30 thai provinces, making offiCIAl estimate highly inaccurate. McGehee who Devised newer, more accurate estimates and who communicated intel on extent Of insurgency to colby was moved off thai ops in 67 McGehee was Punished for communicating intel that contradicted high level U.S. Gvt Vision of the conflict in southeast asia. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 108-15 Thailand, circa 65 CIA claimed only 2500-4000 communist insurgents in Thailand, mostly centered in northern hills. "CIA reporting insisted that The communists had no popular support and that they had to use terrorist Tactics to force peasants to cooperate with them." reality was that Insurgency was much larger and that cpt was very successful in winning Peasant support. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 100 Thailand. To avoid reporting repressive U.S. Backed gvts, CIA prevents Officers from maintaining contact with general population. It sends Officers, most of whom do not know native language, on two year tours. In 30 years CIA never wrote intel report based on interview with farmer, Though thailand is 80% farmers. Language qualified officers who develop Contacts with working classes are branded as having "gone native" and are Soon dismissed from station. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 165-6 Vietnam. CIA and U.S. Intel community failed to appreCIAte size and nature Communist insurgency in Vietnam. 54 French intel estimated communists Controlled 90% rural Vietnam outside sect domains. Yet until 64 U.S. Intel only twice recorded guerrilla, militia, or other irregular forces in Estimates enemy. Even after communists announced existence nlf and Multi-million person structure, estimates failed include members of Farmers, women's or youth orgs. Until 64 intel made no reference to Members of communist party in svn, the key element in the revolution. "These omissions reveal a lack of understanding of revolutionary Methods and forces." mcgehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 137 Vietnam. CIA during Vietnam conflict never got one "clear cut high-ranking Viet cong agent." CIA developed hundreds of "access agents" but many of Them were dropped for fabrication or lack of content. Colby in "honorable Men" insists that CIA gathered valuable intel from "brave" Vietnamese with High ranks in vc. Claim a sham mcgehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 156 Vietnam. CIA totally ignored four basic data banks about asian communism: French writings on Vietnamese revolution, state dept reports from China in 40s, works by U.S. Scholars and newspeople with access to chinese Communist material, and writings on revolution by mao, ho chi minh, lin Piao, and vo nguyen giap. Agency had 700 people devoted to studying nature And strength of vc but no one was assigned to read communist writings that Laid out what CIA wanted to know. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 186 Vietnam, circa 68 Intel collection on vc activity poorly organized. Hundreds of one or two sentence intel reports were brought to CIA center in Svn where they were filed in safe or thrown away. McGehee writes "collation And analysis never applied." mcgehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 142 Vietnam. Colby in 68 Gave speech which illuminates CIA misunderstanding Of insurgency in svn. Colby insisted the national liberation front, Provisional gvt of svn, and liberation committees had made post-tet Appearances, failed to attract popular support, and comprised "phantom Political skeleton that the communists would use in any negotiation for a Peace treaty or a cease fire." far from phantom structure, communists had Elaborate revolutionary network claiming, by outside estimates, 350,000-500,000 communist party members in addition to the military and Front groups. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 137-8 Vietnam. For chart showing nie, snie, and oci figures on vc size 55-64 See mcgehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 136. All figures incredibly Inaccurate Intel op Vietnam. "Projectile" op begun circa 68 To gather intel on nvn spy Network that had infiltrated high levels thieu gvt. Intel from first year Very sketchy. Eventually, CIA had evidence far-reaching infiltration and Convinced U.S. And Vietnamese offiCIAls to "roll-up" the net. 50 persons Arrested in all, with 41 eventually convicted. Spies included president Thieu's speCIAl assistant for polit affairs and close personal friends. This successful op was bad news for policy makers, for it proved svn gvt Hopelessly penetrated by vc. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 150-6 Intel prod CIA fabricated propaganda often comes back to CIA for organization and Analyses but is not recognized as such. Net result is that CIA and other U.S. Agencies take CIA lies as truth. Example found re China. CIA broadcast Reports from taiwan attributed to mainland that talked of thriving Resistance to cultural revolution. Broadcasts picked up by foreign Broadcast information service and included in daily booklets of Transcriptions from mainland. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 181 Intel-policy Vietnam, 68 mcgehee sent memorandum to Vietnam station chief That documented extent of thai insurgency and figures of vc strength (from Books by pike and conley) that contradicted CIA estimates. Memo was passed Around for week or two and returned with no comment. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 142 Vietnam, 74 CIA officers sent crucial cables directly to langley Indicating svn gvt disintegrating. Tom polgar, station chief saigon, sent Priority cables ordering that reports not be disseminated. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 188 Law Based on secrecy agreement agency may review all writings of current and Prior employees to make sure no classified info is revealed. CIA cited 397 Passages for deletion from original manuscript mcgehee's "deadly Deceits." Many deletions concerned info already in public domain. Agency made mcgehee Produce documentation, finally allowing classified info in public domain to Be put in book. For description legal battle to publish book see mcgehee, R.w. (1983). Deadly Deceits 196-203 CIA felt mcgehee's treatment of agent handling too explicit and Deleted it as classified info from expose. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 35 CIA secrecy oath reads "i do solemnly swear that I will never divulge, Publish or reveal either by word, conduct or any other means such Classified info, intelligence or knowledge, except in the performance of my OffiCIAl duties and in accordance with the law of U.S., unless specifically Authorized in writing in each case by the dci." technically, it is unlawful For officer to discuss most CIA business even with spouse. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 19 Minorities Southeast asia. Major CIA op was building army of hmong hill tribesmen to Fight communist pathet Lao. Apparently CIA could not convince Laotians to Fight so it relied on minority group with many activities co-ordinated by Thailand's police aerial reconnaissance units. "As in Vietnam the CIA Refused to acknowledge the real nature of the communist pathet Lao. Through Paru and the hmong it developed an army loyal to U.S. And dependent on the CIA. But without a commitment by the Laotians, the CIA's private army Finally succumbed to the reality of the overwhelmingly superior pathet Lao Forces. The hmong who cooperated with the CIA are now a dying tribe. The War destroyed their young men. Remnants of their tribe now live an Impoverished, uncertain existence in refugee camps in thailand." mcgehee, R.w. (1983). Deadly Deceits 169 Thailand, circa 63 CIA tried establish close ties with minority hill Tribes and lessen their vulnerability to commie subversion. Part of CI Program included training hill people in medicine and advanced agricultural Methods and providing them breeding stock. CIA also built landing strips Which facilitated military ops. Eventually, because of commie infiltration Near Laotian border, hill villages were shelled and napalmed by thais. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 76-80 Paramilitary Thailand, circa 51-73 CIA created and supported police aerial Reconnaissance units to undertake clandestine ops in denied areas which Included support of hmong ops in Laos. "CIA used paru as an extension of Its own paramilitary officers and to conceal its own role." mcgehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 169 Thailand. Landsdale misrepresented purpose of 4,500 man CIA-supported thai "Border patrol police." 61 Memo says bpp is to prevent thailand from Being a safe haven for for viet minh guerrillas or chinese forces. Viet Minh had dissolved in late 50's and neither viet minh nor chinese operated On thai border. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 169-70 Personnel After lengthy and elaborate screening which included lie detector test, CIA Told candidates at personnel pool that they indeed would be working for CIA And began month long orientation course. Course featured explanation of CIA Branches and "melodramatic, frightening movies on communism." anti-commie Indoctrination culminated in rousing speech by CIA officer stationed europe Who indicated "the soviets attack our flag and our country. Stalin is Fighting to destroy all religion, our allies, and our way of life." mcgehee Reflects "we and the nation would have been better served if the agency had Made us study the subject (communism) seriously rather than simply trying To indoctrinate us." mcgehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 6-8 Case officers operating in foreign countries have insular existence. Because of secrecy demands, officer assoCIAtions narrow to other CIA Personnel and families. McGehee "wondered how we in the CIA could ever be Expected to understand what was happening in a foreign country when we Existed in such a rarefied world, cut off from those we were ostensibly There to help." mcgehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 51-3 Eventually mcgehee placed on probation for voicing criticism over Southeast asian ops and conduct of his superiors. Negative comments were Added to his file and he was condemned to "langley's siberia" doing boring Research in basement filing room. No one within east asian division wanted Him. While "in exile" mcgehee composed memo to colby (then exec director Comptroller of CIA) outlining CIA's inaccurate and biased intel on Vietnam. New dci schlesinger issued directive ordering officers to report all Inappropriate or illegal behavior to him. Just prior to directive, CIA sent McGehee overseas so he could not report this negative info. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 178-9 In 64 McGehee was told by CIA desk chief of thai ops that if he wanted Another tour in thailand, he should not be too critical of station's Reporting. As result of this attitude, officers who wanted to get ahead Gave most reports favorable ratings. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 81 In early 50's CIA drew many para-military officers from pool of National football league rejects. Others had prior training in Military. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 13 Part of CIA recruitment process for officers is personality/intel test. Agency bias is towards an "externalized, regulated, adaptive" individual. "According to this personality portrait, the CIA wants active, charming, Obedient people who can get things done in soCIAl world but have limited Perspective and understanding, who see things in black and white and don't Like to think too much." mcgehee insists that strengths and weaknesses of Agency begin with selection process. McGehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 6-7 Until recently, CIA has had strict policy of not using women as case Officers. "The policy was based on tradition, the perceived inability of Women to operate in foreign, male-oriented societies, and probably a strong Dose of pure, unadulterated sexism." mcgehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 11 Vietnam Vietnam, mcgehee writes: "of course, when I arrived in saigon in 68 The Agency's briefers did not discuss this deplorable history (of brutal CI Ops). They probably were not aware of it themselves. I certainly wasn't. All I knew then was that our policy was based on `intelligence' reports of The numbers of communists in Vietnam that had nothing to do with reality. Either they were the result of unbelievable incompetence or they were Deliberate lies created to dupe the american people. At the time I still Didn't know which." mcgehee, R.W. (1983). Deadly Deceits 141-2 Vietnam, rural buddhist population was particularly resentful of diem's Unfair rule and contempt was exacerbated by police ops, aided by CIA, to Seek out those disloyal to diem. Bernard Fall in "last reflections on war" Observed: "on may 6, 1959, the diem regime passed law 10/59, which provided For a system of drumhead courts capable of handing out death sentences for Even trivial offenses. Thus all south Vietnaese opposition - whether Communist or not - had to become subversives, and did...`four out of five Became suspects and liable to be imprisoned if not executed.'" mcgehee, R.w. (1983). Deadly Deceits 134-5