From: mix@anon.lcs.mit.edu (lcs Mixmaster Remailer)
Newsgroups: alt.conspiracy
Subject: U.S. suitcase nukes diverted for use in U.S.?
Date: 27 Nov 1997 07:00:21 -0800
Message-ID: <19971127150001.29400.qmail@nym.alias.net>

The following information was obtained from a source who must remain
anonymous, for obvious reasons. At this time it is unconfirmed, but if
true, it is important for it to be disseminated as widely as possible,
in the hope that the event can be prevented, or if not prevented, the
true perpetrators revealed and brought to justice. If not true, its
spread is not likely to do any significant harm.

It is recommended that dissemination be by anonymous remailer until this
message appears in a wide variety of outlets.

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Two U.S. "suitcase nukes" have been diverted. The diversion was
accomplished during the manufacturing process, with two more devices
built than official records show, during the first quarter of 1997. The
diversion involved key figures in the management of the manufacturing
operation.

One of these devices is outside the United States, perhaps in Korea, as
of November, 1997, but in U.S. custody, which is contrary to
regulations, but it can be brought back quickly and accounted for if an
audit should reveal its existence.

The second device is in the hands of a clandestine military organization
composed of elements from several services which has been responsible
for several black operations in the past, an organization with links to
several civilian law enforcement agencies, including the BATF and the
FBI. Their intention is to use this device to perpetrate a "terrorist"
incident. Several detonation sites are under consideration, many of them
in and about New York City, including one near the United Nations
building, and others on the West Coast.

It is planned to explain the device after it is detonated as of Russian
origin, and some thought was given to obtaining and using a Russian
"suitcase nuke" for this operation, but they are considered unreliable
and too "dirty". Also, Russian security is better than they would like.
However, a U.S.-made device has a different "signature" than a Russian-
made one does, and an expert can tell the difference.

The diversion was concealed in the following way. Early in the
production process material was set aside for two additional,
unscheduled devices. Records were altered to make it appear that this
material went into scheduled units. The identification numbers are very
similar to the authorized numbers.

What is needed is a thorough lockdown and physical audit of the
manufacturing process and inspection of the physical production records
and units for February and March, 1997. The discrepancy might look like
an innocent data entry error if discovered, but it is not. Look for a
duplicate computer entry in March, 1997.

This audit cannot be done using existing production or management
personnel. All of them are suspect. And such an audit must be done soon,
to prevent further alteration of records that will conceal the
diversion.

It is imperative that all personnel in a position to detect and expose
this operation be alerted and make every effort to prevent it. The loss
of life and damage to public confidence could be considerable. This is a
"Reichstag" operation that must not be allowed to take place.