The Dogmas of Judaism
Chapter VI of Schechter's Studies in Judaism,
First Series, Copyright, 1896 by the Jewish Publication
Society of America (in the public domain)
Index to this essay
[Introductory material] [The
Bible: Are we commanded to believe?] [The
Mishnah - Sanhedrin as source for dogma] [Caraite
belief] [Saadiah and the beginning of
Jewish dogma] [Maimonides and the 13
Articles] [The Anti-Maimonists] [Chasdai
Ibn Crescas] [Albo] [Introductory
material]
The object of this essay is to say about the dogmas of Judaism
a word which I think ought not to be left unsaid.
In speaking of dogmas it must be understood that Judaism does
not ascribe to them any saving power. The belief in a dogma or
a doctrine without abiding by its real or supposed consequences
(eg. the, belief in creatio ex nihilo without keeping
the Sabbath) is of no value. And the question about certain doctrines
is not whether they possess or do not possess the desired charm
against certain diseases of the soul, but whether they ought
to be considered as characteristics of Judaism or not.
It must again be premised that the subject, which occupied
the thoughts of the greatest and noblest Jewish minds for so
many centuries, has been neglected for a comparatively long time.
And this for various reasons. First, there is Mendelssohn's assertion,
or supposed assertion, in his Jerusalem, that Judaism
has no dogmas -- an assertion which has been accepted by the
majority of modern Jewish theologians as the only dogma Judaism
possesses. You can hear it pronounced in scores of Jewish pulpits;
you can read it written in scores of Jewish books. To admit the
possibility that Mendelssohn was in error was hardly permissible,
especially for those with [p. 148] whom he enjoys a certain infallibility.
Nay, even the fact that he himself was not consistent in his
theory, and on another occasion declared that Judaism has dogmas,
only that they are purer and more in harmony with reason than
those of other religions; or even the more important fact that
he published a school-book for children, in which the so-called
Thirteen Articles were embodied, only that instead of the formula
"I believe," he substituted "I am convinced,"
-- even such patent facts did not produce much effect upon many
of our modern theologians. [n. 1] They were either overlooked
or explained away so as to make them harmonise with the great
dogma of dogmalessness. For it is one of the attributes of infallibility,
that the words of its happy possessor must always be reconcilable
even when they appear to the eye of the unbeliever as gross contradictions.
Another cause of the neglect into which the subject has fallen
is that our century is an historical one. It is not only
books that have their fate, but also whole sciences and literatures.
In past times it was religious speculation that formed the favorite
study of scholars, in our time it is history with its critical
foundation on a sound philology. Now as these two most important
branches of Jewish science were so long neglected -- were perhaps
never cultivated in the true meaning of the word, and as Jewish
literature is so vast and Jewish history so far-reaching and
eventful, we cannot wonder that these studies have absorbed the
time and the labour of the greatest and best Jewish writers in
this century.
There is, besides, a certain tendency in historical studies
that is hostile to mere theological speculation. The historian
deals with realities, the theologian with abstrac- [p149] tions.
The latter likes to shape the universe after his system, and
tells us how things ought to be, the former teaches us how they
are or have been, and the explanation he gives for their being
so and not otherwise includes in most cases also a kind of justification
for their existence. There is also the odium theologicum,
which has been the cause of so much misfortune that it is hated
by the historian, whilst the superficial, rationalistic way in
which the theologian manages to explain everything which does
not suit his system is most repulsive to the critical spirit.
But it cannot be denied that this neglect has caused much
confusion. Especially is this noticeable in England, which is
essentially a theological country, and where people are but little
prone to give up speculation about things which concern their
most sacred interest and greatest happiness. Thus whilst we are
exceedingly poor in all other branches of Jewish learning, we
are comparatively rich in productions of a theological character.
We have a superfluity of essays on such delicate subjects as
eternal punishment, immortality of the soul, the day of judgment,
etc., and many treatises on the definition of Judaism. But knowing
little or nothing of the progress recently made in Jewish theology,
of the many protests against all kinds of infallibility, whether
canonised in this century or in olden times, we in England still
maintain that Judaism has no dogmas as if nothing to the contrary
had ever been said. We seek the foundation of Judaism in political
economy, in hygiene, in everything except religion. Following
the fashion of the day to esteem religion in proportion to its
ability to adapt itself to every possible and impossible metaphysical
and social system, we are [p. 150] anxious to squeeze out of
Judaism the last drop of faith and hope, and strive to make it
so flexible that we can turn it in every direction which it is
our pleasure to follow. But alas! the flexibility has progressed
so far as to classify Judaism among the invertebrate species,
the lowest order of living things. It strongly resembles a certain
Christian school which addresses itself to the world in general
and claims to satisfy everybody alike. It claims to be socialism
for the adherents of Karl Marx and Lassalle, worship of man for
the followers of Comte and St. Simon; it carefully avoids the
word "God" for the comfort of agnostics and sceptics,
whilst on the other hand it pretends to hold sway over paradise,
hell, and immortality for the edification of believers. In such
illusions many of our theologians delight. For illusions they
are; you cannot be everything if you want to be anything. Moreover,
illusions in themselves are bad enough, but we are menaced with
what is still worse. Judaism, divested of every higher religious
motive, is in danger of falling into gross materialism. For what
else is the meaning of such declarations as "Believe what
you like, but conform to this or that mode of life"; what
else does it mean but "We cannot expect you to believe that
the things you are bidden to do are commanded by a higher authority;
there is not such a thing as belief, but you ought to do them
for conventionalism or for your own convenience."
But both these motives -- the good opinion of our neighbours,
as well as our bodily health -- have nothing to do with our nobler
and higher sentiments, and degrade Judaism to a matter of expediency
or diplomacy. Indeed, things have advanced so far that well-meaning,
but ill-advised writers even think to render a service to Judaism
[p. 151] by declaring it to be a kind of enlightened Hedonism,
or rather a moderate Epicureanism.
I have no intention of here answering the question, What is
Judaism ? This question is not less perplexing than the problem,
What is God's world? Judaism is also a great Infinite, composed
of as many endless Units, the Jews. And these Unit-Jews have
been, and are still, scattered through all the world, and have
passed under an immensity of influences, good and bad. If so,
how can we give an exact definition of the Infinite, called Judaism?
But if there is anything sure, it is that the highest motives
which worked through the history of Judaism are the strong belief
in God and the unshaken confidence that at last this God, the
God of Israel, will be the God of the whole world; or, in other
words, Faith and Hope are the two most prominent characteristics
of Judaism.
In the following pages I shall try to give a short account
of the manner in which these two principles of Judaism found
expression, from the earliest times down to the age of Mendelssohn;
that is, to present an outline of the history of Jewish Dogmas.
First, a few observations on the position of the Bible and the
Talmud in relation to our theme. Insufficient and poor as they
may be in proportion to the importance of these two fundamental
documents of Judaism, these remarks may nevertheless suggest
a connecting link between the teachings of Jewish antiquity and
those of Maimonides and his successors.
[The Bible]
I begin with the Scriptures.
The Bible itself hardly contains a command bidding us to
believe. We are hardly ordered, e.g., to believe in
the existence of God. I say hardly, but I do not altogether deny
the existence of such a command. It is true that we [p. 152]
do not find in the Scripture such words as: "You are commanded
to believe in the existence of God." Nor is any punishment
assigned as awaiting him who denies it. Notwithstanding these
facts, many Jewish authorities -- among them such important men
as Maimonides, R. Judah Hallevi, Nachmanides -- perceive, in
the first words of the Ten Commandments, "I am the Lord
thy God," the command to believe in His existence. [n. 2]
Be this as it may, there cannot be the shadow of a doubt that
the Bible, in which every command is dictated by God, and in
which all its heroes are the servants, the friends, or the ambassadors
of God, presumes such a belief in every one to whom those laws
are dictated, and these heroes address themselves. Nay, I think
that the word "belief" is not even adequate. In a world
with so many visible facts and invisible causes, as life and
death, growth and decay, light and darkness; in a world where
the sun rises and sets; where the stars appear regularly; where
heavy rains pour down from the sky, often accompanied by such
grand phenomena as thunder and lightning; in a world full of
such marvels, but into which no notion has entered of all our
modern true or false explanations -- who but God is behind all
these things? "Have the gates," asks God, "have
the gates of death been open to thee? or hast thou seen the doors
of the shadow of death? . . .Where is the way where light dwelleth?
and as for darkness, where is the place thereof ? . . . Hath
the rain a father? or who hath begotten the drops of dew? . .
. Canst thou bind the sweet influences of Pleiades, or loose
the bands of Orion ? . . . Canst thou send lightnings, that they
may go, and say unto thee, Here we are?" (Job xxxviii.).
Of all these wonders, God, [p. 153] was not merely the prima
causa; they were the result of His direct action, without
any intermediary causes. And it is as absurd to say that the
ancient world believed in God, as for a future historian to assert
of the nineteenth century that it believed in the effects of
electricity. We see them, and so antiquity saw God. If there
was any danger, it lay not in the denial of the existence of
a God, but in having a wrong belief. Belief in as many gods as
there are manifestations in nature, the investing of them with
false attributes, the misunderstanding of God's relation to men,
lead to immorality. Thus the greater part of the laws and teachings
of the Bible are either directed against polytheism, with all
its low ideas of God, or rather of gods; or they are directed
towards regulating God's relation to men. Man is a servant of
God, or His prophet, or even His friend. But this relationship
man obtains only by his conduct. Nay, all man's actions are carefully
regulated by God, and connected with His holiness. The 19th chapter
of Leviticus, which is considered by the Rabbis as the portion
of the Law in which the most important articles of the Torah
are embodied, is headed, "Ye shall be holy, for I the Lord
your own God am holy." And each law therein occurring, even
those which concern our relations to each other, is not founded
on utilitarian reasons, but is ordained because the opposite
of it is an offence to the holiness of God, and profanes His
creatures, whom He desired to be as holy as He is. [n. 3]
Thus the whole structure of the Bible is built upon the visible
fact of the existence of a God, and upon the belief in the relation
of God to men, especially to Israel. In spite of all that has
been said to the contrary, the Bible does lay stress upon belief,
where belief is required. The [p. 154] unbelievers are rebuked
again and again. "For all this they sinned still, and believed
not for His wondrous work," complains Asaph (Ps. lxxviii.
32). And belief is praised in such exalted words as, "Thus
saith the Lord, I remember thee, the kindness of thy youth, the
love of thine espousals, when thou wentest after me in the wilderness,
in a land that was not sown" (Jer.ii. 2). The Bible, especially
the books of the prophets, consists, in great part, of promises
for the future, which the Rabbis justly termed the "Consolations."
[n. 4] For our purpose, it is of no great consequence to examine
what future the prophets had in view, whether an immediate future
or one more remote, at the end of days. At any rate, they inculcated
hope and confidence that God would bring to pass a better time.
I think that even the most advanced Bible critic -- provided
he is not guided by some modern Aryan reasons -- must perceive
in such passages as, "The Lord shall reign for ever and
ever," "The Lord shall rejoice n his works," and
many others, a hope for more than the establishment of the "national
Deity among his votaries in Palestine."
We have now to pass over an interval of many centuries, the
length of which depends upon the views held is to the date of
the close of the canon, and examine what the Rabbis, the representatives
of the prophets, thought on this subject. Not that the views
of the author of the Wisdom of Solomon, of Philo and Aristobulus,
and many others of the Judaeo-Alexandrian school would be uninteresting
for us. But somehow their influence on Judaism was only a passing
one, and their doctrines never became authoritative in the Synagogue.
We must here confine ourselves to those who, even by the [p.
155] testimony of their bitterest enemies, occupied the seat
of Moses.
The successors of the prophets had to deal with new circumstances,
and accordingly their teachings were adapted to the wants of
their times. As the result of manifold foreign influences, the
visible fact of the existence of God as manifested in the Bible
had been somewhat obscured. Prophecy ceased, and the Holy Spirit
which inspired a few chosen ones took its place. Afterwards this
influence was reduced to the hearing of a Voice from Heaven,
which was audible to still fewer. On the other hand the Rabbis
had this advantage that they were not called upon to fight against
idolatry as their predecessors the prophets had been. The evil
inclination to worship idols was, as the Talmud expresses it
allegorically, killed by the Men of the Great Synagogue, or,
as we should put it, it was suppressed by the sufferings of the
captivity in Babylon. This change of circumstances is marked
by the following fact: -- Whilst the prophets mostly considered
idolatry as the cause of all sin, the Rabbis show a strong tendency
to ascribe sin to a defect in, or a want of, belief on the part
of the sinner. They teach that Adam would not have sinned unless
he had first denied the "Root of all" (or the main
principle), namely, the belief in the Omnipresence of God. Of
Cain they say that before murdering his brother he declared:
"There is no judgment, there is no judge, there is no world
to come, and there is no reward for the just, and no punishment
for the wicked." [n. 5]
In another place we read that the commission of a sin in secret
is an impertinent attempt by the doer to oust God from the world.
But if unbelief is considered as [p. 156] the root of all evil,
we may expect that the reverse of it, a perfect faith, would
be praised in the most exalted, terms. So we read: Faith is so
great that the man who possesses it may hope to become a worthy
vessel of the Holy Spirit, or, as we should express it, that
he may hope to obtain by this power the highest degree of communion
with his Maker. The Patriarch Abraham, notwithstanding all his
other virtues, only became "the possessor of both worlds"
by the merit of his strong faith. Nay, even the fulfilment of
a single law when accompanied by true faith is, according to
the Rabbis, sufficient to bring man nigh to God. And the future
redemption is also conditional on the degree of faith shown by
Israel. [n. 6]
It has often been asked what the Rabbis would have thought
of a man who fulfils every commandment of the Torah, but does
not believe that this Torah was given by God, or that there exists
a God at all. It is indeed very difficult to answer this question
with any degree of certainty. In the time of the Rabbis people
were still too simple for such a diplomatic religion, and conformity
in the modern sense was quite an unknown thing. But from the
foregoing remarks it would seem that the Rabbis could not conceive
such a monstrosity as atheistic orthodoxy. For, as we have seen,
the Rabbis thought that unbelief must needs end in sin, for faith
is the origin of all good. Accordingly, in the case just supposed
they would have either suspected the man's orthodoxy, or would
have denied that his views were really what he professed them
to be.
[The Mishnah]
Still more important than the above cited Agadic passages
is one which we are about to quote from the tractate Sanhedrin.
This tractate deals with the constitution of the supreme law-court,
the examination of the witnesses, the functions of the judges,
and the different punishment to be inflicted on the transgressors
of the law. After having enumerated various kinds of capital
punishment, the Mishnah adds the following words:
"These are (the men) who are excluded from the life to
come: He who says there is no resurrection from death; he who
says there is no Torah given from heaven, and the Epikurus. [n.
7]
This passage was considered by the Rabbis of the Middle Ages,
as well as by modern scholars, the locus classicus for
the dogma question. There are many passages in the Rabbinic literature
which exclude man from the world to come for this or that sin.
But these are more or less of an Agadic (legendary) character,
and thus lend themselves to exaggeration and hyperbolic language.
They cannot, therefore, be considered as serious legal dicta,
or as the general opinion of the Rabbis.
The Mishnah in Sanhedrin, however, has, if only by its position
in a legal tractate, a certain Halachic (obligatory) character.
And the fact that so early an authority as R. Akiba made additions
to it guarantees its high antiquity. The first two sentences
of this Mishnah are clear enough. In modern language, and positively
speaking, they would represent articles of belief in Resurrection
and Revelation. Great difficulty is found in defining what was
meant by the word Epicurus. The authorities of the Middle
Ages, to whom I shall again have to refer, explain the Epikurus
to be a man who denies the belief in reward and punishment; others
identify him with one who denies the belief in Providence; while
others again consider the Epikurus to be one who denies Tradition.
But the paral- [p. 158] lel passages in which it occurs incline
one rather to think that this word cannot be defined by one kind
of heresy. It implies rather a frivolous treatment of the words
of Scripture or of Tradition. In the case of the latter (Tradition)
it is certainly not honest difference of opinion that is condemned;
for the Rabbis themselves differed very often from each other,
and even Mediaeval authorities, did not feel any compunction
about explaining Scripture in variance with the Rabbinic interpretation,
and sometimes they even went so far as to declare that the view
of this or that great authority was only to be considered as
an isolated opinion not deserving particular attention. What
they did blame was, as already said, scoffing and impiety. We
may thus safely assert that reverence for the teachers of Israel
formed the third essential principle of Judaism. [n. 8]
I have still to remark that there occur in the Talmud such
passages as "the Jew, even if he has sinned, is still a
Jew," or "He who denies idolatry is called a Jew."
These and similar passages have been used to prove that Judaism
was not a positive religion, but only involved the negation of
idolatry. But it has been overlooked that the statements quoted
have more a legal than a theological character. The Jew belonged
to his nationality even after having committed the greatest sin,
just as the Englishman does not cease to be an Englishman --
in regard to treason and the like -- by having committed a heinous
crime. But he has certainly acted in a very un-English way, and
having outraged the feelings of the whole nation will have to
suffer for his misconduct. The Rabbis in a similar manner did
not maintain that he who gave up the belief in Revelation and
Resurrection, and treated irreverently the teach- [p. 159] ers
of Israel, severed his connection with the Jewish nation, but
that, for his crime, he was going to suffer the heaviest punishment.
He was to be excluded from the world to come.
Still, important as is the passage quoted from Sanhedrin,
it would be erroneous to think that it exhausted the creed of
the Rabbis. The liturgy and innumerable passages in the Midrashim
show that they ardently clung to the belief in the advent of
the Messiah. All their hope was turned to the future redemption
and the final establishment of the Kingdom of Heaven on earth.
Judaism, stripped of this belief, would have been for them devoid
of meaning. The belief in reward and punishment is also repeated
again and again in the old Rabbinic literature. A more emphatic
declaration of the belief in Providence than is conveyed by the
following passages is hardly conceivable. "Everything is
foreseen, and free will is given. And the world is judged by
grace." Or, "the born are to die, and the dead to revive,
and the living to be judged. For to know and to notify, and that
it may be known that He (God) is the Framer and He the Creator,
and He the Discerner, and He the judge, and He the Witness,"
etc. [n. 9]
But it must not be forgotten that it was not the habit of
the Rabbis to lay down, either for conduct or for doctrine, rules
which were commonly known. When they urged the three points stated
above there must have been some historical reason for it. Probably
these principles were controverted by some heretics. Indeed,
the whole tone of the passage cited from Sanhedrin is a protest
against certain unbelievers who are threatened with punishment.
Other beliefs, not less essential, but less disputed, remain
[p. 160] unmentioned, because there was no necessity to assert
them.
[The Caraites]
It was not till a much later time, when the Jews came into
closer contact with new philosophical schools, and also new creeds
which were more liable than heathenism was to be confused with
Judaism, that this necessity was felt. And thus we are led at
once to the period when the Jews became acquainted with the teachings
of the Mohammedan schools. The Caraites came very early into
contact with non-Jewish systems. And so we find that they were
also the first to formulate Jewish dogmas in a fixed number,
and in a systematic order. It is also possible that their separation
from the Tradition, and their early division into little sects
among themselves, compelled them to take this step, in order
to avoid further sectarianism.
The number of their dogmas amounts to ten. According to Judah
Hadasi (150), who would appear to have derived them from his
predecessors, their dogmas include the following articles:
- Creatio ex nihilo;
- The existence of a Creator, God;
- This God is an absolute unity as well as incorporeal;
- Moses and the other prophets were sent by God;
- God has given to us the Torah, which is true and complete
in every respect, not wanting the addition of the so-called Oral
Law;
- The Torah must be studied by every Jew in the original (Hebrew)
language;
- The Holy Temple was a place elected by God for His manifestation;
- Resurrection of the dead;
- Punishment and reward after death;
- The Coming of the Messiah, the son of David.
How far the predecessors of Hadasi were influenced by a certain
Joseph Albashir (about 950), of whom there exists a manuscript
work, "Rudiments of Faith," I am unable to [p. 161]
say. The little we know of him reveals more of his intimacy with
Arabic thoughts than of his importance for his sect in particular
and for Judaism in general. After Hadasi I shall mention here
Elijah Bashazi, a Caraite writer of the end of the fifteenth
century. This author, who was much influenced by Maimonides,
omits the second and the seventh articles. In order to make up
the ten he numbers the belief in the eternity of God as an article,
and divides the fourth article into two. In the fifth article
Bashazi does not emphasize so strongly the completeness of the
Torah as Hadasi, and omits the portion which is directed against
Tradition. It is interesting to see the distinction which Bashazi
draws between the Pentateuch and the Prophets. While he thinks
that the five books of Moses can never be altered, he regards
the words of the Prophets as only relating to their contemporaries,
and thus subject to changes. As I do not want to anticipate Maimonides'
system, I must refrain from giving here the articles laid down
by Solomon Troki in the beginning of the eighteenth century.
For the articles of Maimonides are copied by this writer with
a few slight alterations so as to dress them in a Caraite garb.
I must dismiss the Caraites with these few remarks, my object
being chiefly to discuss the dogmas of the Synagogue from which
they had separated themselves. Besides, as in everything Caraitic,
there is no further development of the question. As Bashazi laid
them down, they are still taught by the Caraites of to-day. I
return to the Rabbanites. [n.10]
[Saadiah]
As is well known, Maimonides (1130-1205), was the first Rabbanite
who formulated the dogmas of the Synagogue. But there are indications
of earlier attempts. R. Saadiah [p. 162] Gaon's (892-942) work,
Creeds and Opinions, shows such traces. He says in his
preface, "My heart sickens to see that the belief of my
co-religionists is impure and that their theological views are
confused." The subjects he treats in this book, such as
- creation,
- unity of God,
- resurrection of the dead,
- the future redemption of Israel,
- reward and punishment,
and other kindred theological subjects might thus, perhaps,
be considered as the essentials of the creed that the Gaon desired
to present in a pure and rational form. R. Hannaneel, of Kairowan,
[n. 11] in the first half of the eleventh century, says in one
of his commentaries that to deserve eternal life one must believe
in four things:
- in God,
- in the prophets,
- in a future world where the just will be rewarded,
- and in the advent of the Redeemer.
From R. Judah Hallevi's Cusari, written in the beginning
of the twelfth century, we might argue that the belief in the
election of Israel by God was the cardinal dogma of the author.
[n. 12] Abraham Ibn Daud, a contemporary of Maimonides, in his
book The High Belief, [n. 13] speaks of rudiments,
among which, besides such metaphysical principles as unity, rational
conception of God's attributes, etc., the belief in the immutability
of the Law, etc., is included. Still, all these works are intended
to furnish evidence from philosophy or history for the truth
of religion rather than to give a definition of this truth. The
latter task was undertaken by Maimonides.
[Maimonides]
I refer to the thirteen articles embodied in his first work,
The Commentary to the Mishnah. They are appended to the
Mishnah in Sanhedrin, with which I dealt above. But though they
do not form an independent treatise, Maimonides remarks must
not be considered as merely incidental. [p. 163] That Maimonides
was quite conscious of the importance of this exposition can
be gathered from the concluding words addressed to the reader:
"Know these (words) and repeat them many times, and think
them over in the proper way. God knows that thou wouldst be deceiving
thyself if thou thinkest thou hast understood them by having
read them once or even ten times. Be not, therefore, hasty in
perusing them. I have not composed them with out deep study and
earnest reflection."
The result of this deep study was that the following Thirteen
Articles constitute the creed of Judaism. They are: --
- The belief in the existence of a Creator;
- The belief in His Unity;
- The belief in His Incorporeality;
- The belief in His Eternity;
- The belief that all worship and adoration are due to Him
alone;
- The belief in Prophecy;
- The belief that Moses was the greatest of all Prophets, both
before and after him;
- The belief that the Torah was revealed to Moses on Mount
Sinai;
- The belief in the Immutability of this revealed Torah;
- The belief that God knows the actions of men;
- The belief in Reward and Punishment;
- The belief in the coming of the Messiah;
- The belief in the Resurrection of the dead.
The impulse given by the great philosopher and still ,greater
Jew was eagerly followed by succeeding generations, and Judaism
thus came into possession of a dogmatic literature such as it
never knew before Maimonides. Maimonides is the centre of this
literature, and I shall accordingly speak in the remainder of
this essay of Maimonists and Anti-Maimonists. These terms really
apply to the great controversy that raged round Maimonides Guide
of [p. 164] the Perplexed, but I shall, chiefly for
brevity's sake, employ them in these pages in a restricted sense
to refer to the dispute concerning the Thirteen Articles.
Among the Maimonists we may probably include the great majority
of Jews, who accepted the Thirteen Articles without further question.
Maimonides must indeed have filled up a great gap in Jewish theology,
a gap, moreover, the existence of which was very generally perceived.
A century had hardly elapsed before the Thirteen Articles had
become a theme for the poets of the Synagogue. And almost every
country where Jews lived can show a poem or a prayer founded
on these Articles. R. Jacob Molin (1420) of Germany speaks of
metrical and rhymed songs in the German language, the burden
of which was the Thirteen Articles, and which were read by the
common people with great devotion. The numerous commentaries
and homilies written on the same topic would form a small library
in themselves. [n. 14] But on the other hand it must not be denied
that the Anti-Maimonists, that is to say those Jewish writers
who did not agree with the creed formulated by Maimonides, or
agreed only in part with him, form also a very strong and respectable
minority. They deserve our attention the more as it is their
works which brought life into the subject and deepened it. It
is not by a perpetual Amen to every utterance of a great authority
that truth or literature gains anything.
[The Anti-Maimonists]
The Anti-Maimonists can be divided into two classes. The one
class categorically denies that Judaism has dogmas. I shall have
occasion to touch on this view when I come to speak of Abarbanel.
Here I pass at once to the second class of Anti-Maimonists. This
consists of those who agree with Maimonides as to the existence
of dogmas [p. 165] in Judaism, but who differ from him as to
what these dogmas are, or who give a different enumeration of
them.
As the first of these Anti-Maimonists we may regard Nachmanides,
who, in his famous Sermon in the Presence of the King,
speaks of three fundamental principles:
- Creation (that is, non-eternity of matter),
- Omniscience of God, and
- Providence.
Next comes R. Abba Mari ben Moses, of Montpellier. He wrote
at the beginning of the fourteenth century, and is famous in
Jewish history for his zeal against the study of philosophy.
We possess a small pamphlet by him dealing with our subject,
and it forms a kind of prologue to his collection of controversial
letters against the rationalists of his time. [n. 15] He lays
down three articles as the fundamental teachings of Religion:
- Metaphysical: The existence of God, including His Unity and
Incorporeality;
- Mosaic: Creatio ex nihilo by God -- a consequence
of this principle is the belief that God is capable of altering
the laws of nature at His pleasure;
- Ethical: Special Providence -- i.e., God knows all
our actions in all their details.
Abba Mari does not mention Maimonides' Thirteen Articles.
But it would be false to conclude that he rejected the belief
in the coming of the Messiah, or any other article of Maimonides.
The whole tone and tendency of this pamphlet is polemical, and
it is therefore probable that he only urged those points which
were either doubted or explained in an unorthodox way by the
sceptics of his time.
Another scholar, of Provence, who wrote but twenty years later
than Abba Mari -- R. David ben Samuel d'Estella (1320) -- speaks
of the seven pillars of religion. They are:
- Revelation,
- Providence,
- Reward and Punishment, [p. 166]
- the Coming of the Messiah,
- Resurrection of the Dead,
- Creatio ex nihilo, and
- Free Will. [n. 16]
Of authors living, in other countries, I have to mention here
R. Shemariah, of Crete, who flourished at about the same time
as R. David d'Estella, and is known from his efforts to reconcile
the Caraites with the Rabbanites. This author wrote a book for
the purpose of furnishing Jewish students with evidence for what
he considered the five fundamental teachings of Judaism, viz.:
- The Existence of God;
- The Incorporeality of God;
- His Absolute Unity;
- That God created heaven and earth;
- That God created the world after His will 5106 years ago
-- 5106 (1346 A.C.), being the year in which Shemariah wrote
these words. [n. 17]
In Portugal, at about the same time, we find R. David ben
Yom-Tob Bilia adding to the articles of Maimonides thirteen of
his own, which he calls the "Fundamentals of the Thinking
Man." Five of these articles relate to the functions of
the human soul, that, according to him, emanated from God, and
to the way in which this divine soul receives its punishment
and reward. The other eight articles are as follows:
- The belief in the existence of spiritual beings -- angels;
- Creatio ex nihilo;
- The belief in the existence of another world, and that this
other world is only a spiritual one;
- The Torah is above philosophy;
- The Torah has an outward (literal) meaning and an inward
(allegorical) meaning;
- The text of the Torah is not subject to any emendation;
- The reward of a good action is the good work itself, and
the doer must not expect any other reward;
- It is only by the "commands relating to the heart,"
for instance, the belief in one eternal God, the loving and fearing
Him, and [p. 167] not through good actions, that man attains
the highest degree of perfection. [n. 18]
Perhaps it would be suitable to mention here another contemporaneous
writer, who also enumerates twenty-six articles. The name of
this writer is unknown, and his articles are only gathered from
quotations by later authors. It would seem from these quotations
that the articles of this unknown author consisted mostly of
statements emphasising the belief in the attributes of God: as,
His Eternity, His Wisdom and Omnipotence, and the like. [n.19]
More important for our subject are the productions of the
fifteenth century, especially those of Spanish authors. The fifteen
articles of R. Lipman Muhlhausen, in the preface to his well-known
Book of Victory [n. 20] (1410), differ but slightly from
those of Maimonides. In accordance with the anti-Christian tendency
of his polemical book, he lays more stress on the two articles
of Unity and Incorporeality, and makes of them four. We can therefore
dismiss him with this short remark, and pass at once to the Spanish
Rabbis.
[Chasdai]
The first of these is R. Chasdai Ibn Crescas, who composed
his famous treatise, The Light of God, about 1405. Chasdai's
book is well known for its attacks on Aristotle, and also for
its influence on Spinoza. But Chasdai deals also with Maimonides'
Thirteen Articles, to which he was very strongly opposed. Already
in his preface he attacks Maimonides for speaking, in his Book
of the Commandments, of the belief in the existence of God
as an "affirmative precept." Chasdai thinks it absurd;
for every commandment must be dictated by some authority, but
on whose authority can we dictate the acceptance of this authority?
His general objection to the Thirteen Articles [p. 168] is that
Maimonides confounded dogmas or fundamental beliefs of Judaism,
without which Judaism is inconceivable, with beliefs or doctrines
which Judaism inculcates, but the denial of which, though involving
a strong heresy, does not make Judaism impossible. He maintains
that if Maimonides meant only to count fundamental teachings,
there are not more than seven; but that if he intended also to
include doctrines, he ought to have enumerated sixteen. As beliefs
of the first class -- namely, fundamental beliefs -- he considers
the following articles:
- God's knowledge of our actions;
- Providence;
- God's omnipotence -- even to act against the laws of nature;
- Prophecy;
- Free will;
- The aim of the Torah is to make man long after the closest
communion with God.
The belief in the existence of God, Chasdai thinks, is an
axiom with which every religion must begin, and he is therefore
uncertain whether to include it as a dogma or not. As to the
doctrines which every Jew is bound to believe, but without which
Judaism is not impossible, Chasdai divides them into two sections:
(a)
- Creatio ex nihilo;
- Immortality of the soul;
- Reward and Punishment;
- Resurrection of the dead;
- Immutability of the Torah;
- Superiority of the prophecy of Moses;
- That the High Priest received from God the instructions sought
for, when he put his questions through the medium of the Urim
and Thummim;
- The coming of the Messiah.
(b)Doctrines which are expressed by certain religious
ceremonies, and on belief in which these ceremonies are conditioned:
- The belief in the efficacy of prayer as well as in the power
of the benediction of the priests to convey to us the blessing
of God;
- God is merciful to the penitent;
- Certain days in the year -- for instance, [p. 169] the Day
of Atonement -- are especially qualified to bring us near to
God, if we keep them in the way we are commanded.
That Chasdai is a little arbitrary in the choice of his "doctrines,"
I need hardly say. Indeed, Chasdai's importance for the dogma-question
consists more in his critical suggestions than in his positive
results. He was, as we have seen, the first to make the distinction
between fundamental teachings which form the basis of Judaism,
and those other simple Jewish doctrines without which Judaism
is not impossible. Very daring is his remark, when proving that
Reward and Punishment, Immortality of the soul, and Resurrection
of the dead must not be considered as the basis of Judaism, since
the highest ideal of religion is to serve God without any hope
of reward. Even more daring are his words concerning the Immutability
of the Law. He says: "Some have argued that, since God is
perfection, so must also His law be perfect, and thus unsusceptible
of improvement." But he does not think this argument conclusive,
though the fact in itself (the Immutability of the Law) is true.
For one might answer that this perfection of the Torah could
only be in accordance with the intelligence of those for whom
it was meant; but as soon as the recipients of the Torah have
advanced to a higher state of perfection, the Torah must also
be altered to suit their advanced intelligence. A pupil of Chasdai
illustrates the words of his master by a medical parallel. The
physician has to adapt his medicaments to the various stages
through which his patient has to pass. That he changes his prescription
does not, however, imply that his medical knowledge is imperfect,
or that his earlier remedies were ignorantly chosen; the varying
condition of the invalid was the cause of the variation [p. 170]
in the doctor's treatment. Similarly, were not the Immutability
of the Torah a "doctrine," one might maintain that
the perfection of the Torah would not be inconsistent with the
assumption that it was susceptible of modification, in accordance
with our changing and progressive circumstances. But all these
arguments are purely of a theoretic character; for, practically,
every Jew, according to Chasdai, has to accept all these beliefs)
whether he terms them fundamental teachings or only Jewish doctrines.
[n. 21]
Some years later, though he finished his work in the same
year as Chasdai, R. Simeon Duran (1366-1444,) a younger contemporary
of the former, made his researches on dogmas. His studies on
this subject form a kind of introduction to his commentary on
Job, which he finished in the year I405. Duran is not so strongly
opposed to the Thirteen Articles as Chasdai, or as another "thinker
of our people," who thought them an arbitrary imitation
of the thirteen attributes of God. Duran tries to justify Maimonides;
but nevertheless he agrees with "earlier authorities,"
who formulated the Jewish creed in Three Articles -- The Existence
of God, Revelation, and Reward and Punishment -- under which
Duran thinks the Thirteen Articles of Maimonides may be easily
classed. Most interesting are his remarks concerning the validity
of dogmas. He tells us that only those are to be considered as
heretics who abide by their own opinions, though they know that
they are contradictory to the views of the Torah. Those who accept
the fundamental teachings of Judaism, but are led by their deep
studies and earnest reflection to differ in details from the
opinions current among their co-religionists, and explain certain
passages [p. 171] in the Scripture in their own way, must by
no means be considered as heretics. We must, therefore, Duran
proceeds to say, not blame such men as Maimonides, who gave an
allegorical interpretation to certain passages in the Bible about
miracles, or R. Levi ben Gershom, who followed certain un-Jewish
views in relation to the belief in Creatio ex nihilo.
Only the views are condemnable, not those who cherish them. God
forbid, says Duran, that such a thing should happen in Israel
as to condemn honest inquirers on account of their differing
opinions. It would be interesting to know of how many divines
as tolerant as this persecuted Jew the fifteenth century can
boast. [n. 21]
[Albo]
We can now pass to a more popular but less original writer
on our theme. I refer to R. Joseph Albo, the author of the Roots,
[n. 23] who was the pupil of Chasdai, a younger contemporary
of Duran, and wrote at a much later period than these authors.
Graetz has justly denied him much originality. The chief merit
of Albo consists in popularising other people's thoughts, though
he does not always take care to mention their names. And the
student who is a little familiar with the contents of the Roots
will easily find that Albo has taken his best ideas either from
Chasdai or from Duran. As it is of little consequence to us whether
an article of faith is called "stem," or "root,"
or "branch," there is scarcely anything fresh left
to quote in the name of Albo. The late Dr. Low, of Szegedin,
was indeed right, when he answered an adversary who challenged
him -- "Who would dare to declare me a heretic as long as
I confess the Three Articles laid down by Albo?" with the
words "Albo himself." For, after all the subtle distinctions
Albo makes between [p. 172] different classes of dogmas, he declares
that every one who denies even the immutability of the Law or
the coming of the Messiah, which are, according to him, articles
of minor importance, is a heretic who will be excluded from the
world to come. But there is one point in his book which is worth
noticing. It was suggested to him by Maimonides, indeed; still
Albo has the merit of having emphasised it as it deserves. Among
the articles which he calls "branches" Albo counts
the belief that the perfection of man, which leads to eternal
life, can be obtained by the fulfilling of one commandment. But
this command must, as Maimonides points out, be done without
any worldly regard, and only for the love of God. When one considers
how many platitudes are repeated year by year by certain theologians
on the subject of Jewish legalism, we cannot lay enough stress
on this article of Albo, and we ought to make it better known
than it has hitherto been. [n. 24]
Though I cannot enter here into the enumeration of the Maimonists,
I must not leave unmentioned the name of R. Nissim ben Moses
of Marseilles, the first great Maimonist, who flourished about
the end of the thirteenth century, and was considered as one
of the most enlightened thinkers of his age. [n. 25] Another
great Maimonist deserving special attention is R. Abraham ben
Shem-Tob Bibago, who may perhaps be regarded as the most prominent
among those who undertook to defend Maimonides against the attacks
of Chasdai and others. Bibago wrote The Path of Belief
[n.26] in the second half of the fifteenth century, and was,
as Dr. Steinschneider aptly describes him, a Denkglaubiger.
But, above all, he was a believing Jew. When he was once asked,
at the table of King [p. 173] John II., of Aragon, by a Christian
scholar, "Are you the Jewish philosopher?" he answered,
"I am a Jew who believes in the Law given to us by our teacher
Moses, though I have studied philosophy." Bibago was such
a devoted admirer of Maimonides that he could not tolerate any
opposition to him. He speaks in one passage of the prudent people
of his time who, in desiring to be looked upon as orthodox by
the great mob, calumniated the Teacher (Maimonides), and depreciated
his merits. Bibago's book is very interesting, especially in
its controversial parts; but in respect to dogmas he is, as already
said, a Maimonist, and does not contribute any new point on our
subject.
To return to the Anti-Maimonists of the second half of the
fifteenth century. As such may be considered R. Isaac Aramah,
who speaks of three foundations of religion:
- Creatio ex nihilo,
- Revelation (?),
- and the belief in a world to come. [n. 27]
Next to be mentioned is R. Joseph Jabez, who also accepts
only three articles:
- Creatio ex nihilo,
- Individual Providence, and
- the Unity of God. [n. 22]
Under these three heads he tries to classify the Thirteen
Articles of Maimonides.
[Abarbanel]
The last Spanish writer on our subject is R. Isaac Abarbanel.
His treatise on the subject is known under the title Top of
Amanah [n. 29] and was finished in the year 1495. The greatest
part of this treatise forms a defence of Maimonides, many points
in which are taken from Bibago. But, in spite of this fact, Abarbanel
must not be considered a Maimonist. It is only a feeling of piety
towards Maimonides, or perhaps rather a fondness for argument,
that made him defend Maimonides against Chasdai and others. His
own view is that it is a mistake [p. 174] to formulate dogmas
of Judaism, since every word in the Torah has to be considered
as a dogma for itself. It was only, says Abarbanel, by following
the example of non-Jewish scholars that Maimonides and others
were induced to lay down dogmas. The non-Jewish philosophers
are in the habit of accepting in every science certain indisputable
axioms from which they deduce the propositions which are less
evident. The Jewish philosophers in a similar way sought for
first principles in religion from which the whole of the Torah
ought to be considered as a deduction. But, thinks Abarbanel,
the Torah as a revealed code is under no necessity of deducing
things from each other, for all the commandments came from the
same divine authority, and, therefore, are alike evident, and
have the same certainty. On this and similar grounds Abarbanel
refused to acccept dogmatic articles for Judaism, and he this
became the head of the school that forms a class by itself among
the anti- Maimonists to which many of the great Cabbalists belong.
But it is idle talk to cite this school in aid of the modern
theory that Judaism has no dogmas. As we have seen, it was rather
an embarras de riches that prevented Abarbanel from accepting
the Thirteen Articles of Maimonides. To him and to the Cabbalists
the Torah consists of at least 613 Articles.
Abarbanel wrote his book with which we have just dealt, at
Naples. And it is Italy to which, after the expulsion of the
Jews from Spain, we have to look chiefly for religious speculation.
But the philosophers of Italy are still less independent of Maimonides
than their predecessor in Spain. Thus we find that R. David Messer
Leon, R. David Vital, and others were Maimonists.
[Delmedigo]
[p. 175] Even the otherwise refined and original thinker,
R. Elijah Delmedigo (who died about the end of the fifteenth
century) becomes almost impolite when he speaks of the adversaries
of Maimonides in respect to dogmas. "It was only,"
he says, "the would-be philosopher that dared to question
the articles of Maimonides. Our people have always the bad habit
of thinking themselves competent to attack the greatest authorities
as soon as they have got some knowledge of the subject. Genuine
thinkers, however, attach very little importance to their objections."
[n. 30]
Indeed, it seems as if the energetic protests of Delmedigo
scared away the Anti-Maimonists for more than a century. Even
in the following seventeenth century we have to notice only two
Anti-Maimonists. The one is R. Tobijah, the Priest (1652), who
was of Polish descent, studied in Italy, and lived as a medical
man in France. He seems to refuse to accept the belief in the
Immutability of the Torah, and in the coming of the Messiah,
as fundamental teachings of Judaism. [n. 31] The other, at the
end of the seventeenth century (1695), is R. Abraham Chayim Viterbo,
of Italy. He accepts only six articles:
- Existence of God;
- Unity;
- Incorporeality;
- That God was revealed to Moses on Mount Sinai, and that the
prophecy of Moses is true;
- Revelation (including the historical parts of the Torah);
- Reward and Punishment.
As to the other articles of Maimonides, Viterbo, in opposition
to other half-hearted Anti-Maimonists, declares that the man
who denies them is not to be considered as a heretic ; though
he ought to believe them. [n. 32]
I have now arrived at the limit I set to myself at the beginning
of this essay. For, between the times of [p. 176] Viterbo and
those of Mendelssohn, there is hardly to be found any serious
opposition to Maimonides worth noticing here. Still I must mention
the name of R. Saul Berlin (died 1794); there is much in his
opinions on dogmas which will help us the better to understand
the Thirteen Articles of Maimonides. As the reader has seen,
I have refrained so far from reproducing here the apologies which
were made by many Maimonists in behalf of the Thirteen Articles.
For, after all their elaborate pleas, none of them was able to
clear Maimonides of the charge of having confounded dogmas or
fundamental teachings with doctrines. It is also true that the
Fifth Article -- that prayer and worship must only be offered
to God -- cannot be considered even as a doctrine, but as a simple
precept. And there are other difficulties which all the distinctions
of the Maimonists will never be able to solve. The only possible
justification is, I think, that suggested by a remark of R. Saul.
This author, who was himself -- like his friend and older contemporary
Mendelssohn -- a strong Anti-Maimonist, among other remarks,
maintains that dogmas must never be laid down but with regard
to the necessities of the time. [n. 33]
Now R. Saul certainly did not doubt that Judaism is based
on eternal truths which can in no way be shaken by new modes
of thinking or changed circumstances. What he meant was that
there are in every age certain beliefs which ought to be asserted
more emphatically than others, without regard to their theological
or rather logical importance. It is by this maxim that we shall
be able to explain the articles of Maimonides. He asserted them,
because they were necessary for his time.
[p. 177]We know, for instance, from a letter of his son and
from other contemporaries, that it was just at his time that
the belief in the incorporeality of God was, in the opinion of
Maimonides, a little relaxed. Maimonides, who thought such low
notions of the Deity dangerous to Judaism, therefore laid down
an article against them. He tells us in his Guide that
it was far from him to condemn any one who was not able to demonstrate
the Incorporeality of God, but he stigmatised as a heretic one
who refused to believe it. This position might be paralleled
by that of a modern astronomer who, while considering it unreasonable
to expect a mathematical demonstration of the movements of the
earth from an ordinary unscientific man, would yet regard the
person who refused to believe in such movements as an ignorant
faddist.
Again, Maimonides undoubtedly knew that there may be found
in the Talmud -- that bottomless sea with its innumerable undercurrents
-- passages that are not quite in harmony with his articles;
for instance, the well-known dictum of R. Hillel, who said, there
is no Messiah for Israel -- a passage which has already been
quoted ad nauseam by every opponent of Maimonides from
the earliest times down to the year of grace 1896. Maimonides
was well aware of the existence of this and similar passages.
But, being deeply convinced of the necessity of the belief in
a future redemption of Israel -- in opposition to other creeds
which claim this redemption exclusively for their own adherents
-- Maimonides simply ignored the saying of R. Hillel, as an isolated
opinion which contradicts all the consciousness and traditions
of the Jew as expressed in thousands of other passages, and [p.
178] especially in the liturgy. Most interesting is Maimonides'
view about such isolated opinions in a letter to the wise men
of Marseilles. He deals there with the question of free will
and other theological subjects. After having stated his own view
he goes on to say:
"I know that it is possible to find in the Talmud or
in the Midrash this or that saying in contradiction to the views
you have heard from me. But you must not be troubled by them.
One must not refuse to accept a doctrine, the truth of which
has been proved, on account of its being in opposition to some
isolated opinion held by this or that great authority. Is it
not possible that he overlooked some important considerations
when he uttered this strange opinion ? It is also possible that
his words must not be taken literally, and have to be explained
in an allegorical way. We can also think that his words were
only to be applied with regard to certain circumstances of his
time, but never intended as permanent truths. . . . No man must
surrender his private judgment. The eyes are not directed backwards
but forwards."
In another place Maimonides calls the suppression of one's
own opinions for the reason of their being irreconcilable with
the isolated views of some great authority -- a moral suicide.
By such motives Maimonides was guided when he left certain
views hazarded in the Rabbinic literature unheeded, and followed
what we may perhaps call the religious instinct, trusting to
his own conscience. We may again be certain that Maimonides was
clear-headed enough to see that the words of the Torah: "And
there arose no prophet since in Israel like unto Moses"
(Deut. xxxiv. 10), were as little intended to imply a doctrine
as the passage relating to the king Josiah, "And like unto
[p. 179] him was there no king before him that turned to the
Lord with all his heart . . . neither after him arose there any
like him" (2 Kings xxiii. 25). And none would think of declaring
the man a heretic who should believe another king to be as pious
as Josiah. But living among followers of the "imitating
creeds" (as he calls Christianity and Mohammedism), who
claimed that their religion had superseded the law of Moses,
Maimonides, consciously or unconsciously, felt himself compelled
to assert the superiority of the prophecy of Moses. And so we
may guess that every article of Maimonides which seems to offer
difficulties to us contains an assertion of some relaxed belief,
or a protest against the pretensions of other creeds, though
we are not always able to discover the exact necessity for them.
On the other hand, Maimonides did not assert the belief in free
will, for which he argued so earnestly in his Guide. The
common "man," with his simple unspeculative mind, for
whom these Thirteen Articles were intended, "never dreamed
that the will was not free," and there was no necessity
of impressing on his mind things which he had never doubted.
[n. 34]
So much about Maimonides. As to the Anti-Maimonists, it could
hardly escape the reader that in some of the quoted systems the
difference from the view of Maimonides is only a logical one,
not a theological. Of some authors again, especially those of
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, it is not at all certain
whether they intended to oppose Maimonides. Others again, as
for instance R. Abba Mari, R. Lipman, and R. Joseph Jabez, acted
on the same principle as Maimonides, urging only those teachings
of Judaism which they thought endangered. One could now, indeed,
animated by the praiseworthy exam- [p. 180] ples given to us
by Maimonides, also propose some articles of faith which are
suggested to us by the necessities of our own time. One might,
for instance, insert the article, "I believe that Judaism
is, in the first instance, a divine religion, not a mere
complex of racial peculiarities and tribal customs." One
might again propose an article to the effect that Judaism is
a proselytising religion, having the mission to bring about God's
kingdom on earth, and to include in that kingdom all mankind.
One might also submit for consideration whether, it would not
be advisable to urge a little more the principle that religion
means chiefly a Weltanschauung and worship of God by means
of holiness both in thought and in action. One would even not
object to accept the article laid down by R. Saul, that we have
to look upon ourselves as sinners. Morbid as such a belief may
be, it would, if properly impressed on our mind, have perhaps
the wholesome effect of cooling down a little our self importance
and our mutual admiration that makes all progress among us almost
impossible.
But it was not my purpose to ventilate here the question whether
Maimonides' articles are sufficient for us, or whether we ought
not to add new ones to them. Nor do I attempt to decide what
system we ought to prefer for recitation in the Synagogue --
that of Maimonides or that of Chasdai, or of any other writer.
I do not think that such a recital is of much use. My object
in this sketch has been rather to make the reader think about
Judaism, by proving that it regulates not only our actions, but
also our thoughts. We usually urge that in Judaism religion means
life; but we forget that a life without guiding principles and
thoughts is a Life not worth living. At [p. 181] least it was
so considered by the greatest Jewish thinkers, and hence their
efforts to formulate the creed of Judaism, so that men should
not only be able to do the right thing, but also to think the
right thing. Whether they succeeded in their attempts towards
formulating the creed of Judaism or not will always remain a
question. This concerns the logician more than the theologian.
But surely Maimonides and his successors did succeed in having
a religion depending directly on God, with the most ideal and
lofty aspirations for the future; whilst the Judaism of a great
part of our modern theologians reminds one very much of the words
with which the author of Marius the Epicurean characterises
the Roman religion in the days of her decline: a religion which
had been always something to be done rather than something to
be thought, or believed, or loved.
Political economy, hygiene, statistics, are very fine things.
But no sane man would for them make those sacrifices which Judaism
requires from us. It is only for God's sake, to fulfil His commands
and to accomplish His purpose, that religion becomes worth living
and dying for. And this can only be possible with a religion
which possesses dogmas.
It is true that every great religion is "a concentration
of many ideas and ideals," which make this religion able
to adapt itself to various modes of thinking and living. But
there must always be a point round which all these ideas concentrate
themselves. This centre is Dogma. |