The Persian Gulf Deception Part I
Date: Thu, 02 Mar 95 00:04:26 EST
Subject: 6. The Persian Gulf Deception (fwd)
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***THE PERSIAN GULF DECEPTION***
By J. Adams
-Outline of Paper-
A. Introduction
B. Inconsistencies and Contradictions
C. The Deception
D. Confirmation
E. The Strategy
F. Conclusion
* * * * * *
"The great masses of the people...
will more easily fall victims to a great lie than to a small one."
(Adolph Hitler)
"We have no right ever to forget that psychological warfare
is a struggle for winning people's minds."
(Mikhail Gorbachev)
* * * * * *
THE PERSIAN GULF DECEPTION
-Introduction-
"I have a great feeling of a great victory. Anyone who dares
even imply that we did not achieve a great victory obviously
doesn't know what the hell he's talking about." (1)
{Retired General Norman Schwarzkopf}
(Gulf War Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command)
Since Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union there have been
persistent and exceptional historical contradictions in Soviet behavior.
The consequence of this contradictory behavior has been the breakup of the
Soviet Union and the seeming demise of the 'communist' threat.
Although on the surface the apparent, dramatic turn around in Kremlin
thinking and the consequent collapse of Soviet communism may seem like
positive developments for the West, there is reason to believe they may
actually not be. Secular trends indicate there is a possibility that the
Soviets have undermined their own political and economic power as part of a
grand deception. There is reason to believe that Russia is currently
misleading the world for the purpose of global military domination. An
unprecedented campaign of large-scale deceptions may be underway which has
totally misled the West such that the East can now successfully launch a
surprise third world war. (2)
The crisis in the Persian Gulf may have been a strategic deception
engineered by Moscow.
For America and the West, the Gulf Crisis had a sensational outcome.
First off, through the Gulf War the threat of Saddam Hussein was seemingly
checked and Western interests in the Middle East were secured. Secondly,
the U.S.-led Coalition victory in the Gulf War helped the United States
overcome its disgrace in Vietnam and reinstated its position as the
dominant world hegemon. Lastly, the positive resolution of the Gulf Crisis
marked the beginning of a 'New World Order' in which the threat of
militaristic totalitarianism appears to be dead and the superpowers are
cooperating toward international peace and security.
The problem with the Gulf Crisis and its positive outcome is that it
all may have been literally too good to be true. Something which the West
seemed to conveniently overlook throughout the Crisis was that Iraq had
been a close ally of the Soviet Union for decades prior to the Invasion of
Kuwait. Consequently, the humiliating defeat of Saddam Hussein's Iraq in
the Gulf War, like the modern defeat of Soviet communism, may have been a
deception- an inherently contradictory lie. There is reason to believe
that Saddam intentionally provoked the Gulf War with the sole intention of
handing the West a 'great victory'. He would have done this in cooperation
with Moscow as an important part of an overall strategy to mislead America,
its Western allies, and the world as a whole, so that the East can
successfully launch a surprise attack against the West. In other words,
when it comes right down to it, the Gulf Crisis and subsequent Allied
victory over Iraq may have in actuality been nothing but a seductive lie.
In the following pages I will thoroughly examine how the Persian Gulf
Crisis may have been a deception. There will be four major parts. In part
I, numerous inconsistencies and contradictions associated with the behavior
of Iraq and the Soviets throughout the Gulf Crisis will be brought to
light. In the second part, a circumstantial case will be built for a
Persian Gulf deception based upon the implications of the given
inconsistencies and contradictions. This case will be confirmed by
directly incriminating evidence in part III. In the final part, possible
strategic aims of a Persian Gulf deception will be discussed.
-Part I: Inconsistencies and Contradictions-
-Iraq-
Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait was inconsistent- it was a blatant
provocation for war with the West that went against Iraq's best interest.
Going into the Gulf Crisis Iraq had become a major military threat, and
potential target, for the West. During the 1980's, Saddam Hussein built-up
one of the largest militaries in the world. By 1990, he commanded a
million-man army equipped with a vast arsenal of modern weaponry including
over 4500 tanks, almost 5000 artillery pieces, and upwards of 800 combat
aircraft (3). Saddam also controlled hundreds of anti-ship missiles and
surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, as well as a stockpile of chemical
and possibly biolological munitions. During the 1980's Iraq developed an
extensive military infrastructure involving a comprehensive command,
control, communications, and intelligence (Cµ3I) network. By the summer of
1990, throughout Iraq were radar stations, anti-aircraft artillery,
surface-to-air missile batteries, and weapons production plants which
included facilities for the research and development of chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons. (4)
As Iraqi military power grew, the West became increasingly concerned
about its expanding regional influence. In early May of 1990- just prior
to the Gulf Crisis- 'The New Republic' warned:
"The prospect of Saddam Hussein as top man in the Arab world
and dominant power in the Persian Gulf is not one that civilized
people should welcome. This man is a ruthless killer with a
deep paranoia about the West and grandiose ambitions to be a new
Nasser and to re-create the glories that were Babylon and
Mesopotamia." (5)
All in all, going into the Invasion of Kuwait, the West saw Iraq as a
dangerous military threat and destabilizing force in the richest oil region
of the world. Saddam's growing military power, coupled with his staunch
anti-Israeli and anti-Western mindset, was becoming a major concern for the
West. Iraq could someday unify the Arab world such that the West would be
held hostage by its oil dependency. Even worse, Iraq could eventually
unleash a major regional war involving weapons of mass destruction which
could result in the destruction of Israel. By 1990, Saddam Hussein had
come to embody many of "the serious security problems of the post-cold war
era: aggression, terrorism, virulant tribalism, and missile, nuclear, and
chemical weapons proliferation" (6).
In the weeks and months before Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, Saddam was
putting out some not-so-subtle hints as to his belligerent intentions,
giving the West an opportunity to consider the possibility of a future
confrontation. In a speech made on April 3rd, 1990, Saddam threatened to
"make fire eat up half of Israel", a comment which drew widespread Western
consternation (7). In May, U.S. officials confirmed press rumors that
Saddam told Kuwait: "Iraqi security may require him to occupy Kuwaiti
territory in the future" (8). Such bellicose remarks likely led Western
leaders to consider possible responses should Iraq become aggressive in the
near-future.
As Iraq began to blatantly threaten Kuwait in late July of 1990, the
United States made it clear that it would respond forcefully if need be.
The prevailing sentiment of America's leaders at that time was reflected by
Republican Senator Alfonse D'Amato who denounced Saddam as: "...a butcher,
a killer, a bully. Some day we're going to have to stand up to him. Why
not now?" (9). The State Department announced that the United States would
"remain strongly committed to supporting the individual and collective
self-defence of our friends in the Gulf, with whom we have deep and long-
standing ties" (10). To underscore America's willingness to use military
force against Iraq should events warrant such action, a joint naval
exercise with the United Arab Emirates was hastily arranged and initiated
in the northern Gulf (11).
Apparently unintimidated by American posturing, on August 2nd, 1990,
Saddam proved good on his word and Iraq invaded Kuwait. The West received
the opportunity it needed to do something decisive about the growing Iraqi
threat. Almost immediately, the United States and its Western Allies began
preparing for a war against Iraq. Saddam's military empire could be
forcefully checked before Iraqi regional influence grew too far or before
Iraq's military might became too strong- eventually including nuclear
weapons.
Saddam's provocation was ideal for a decisive Western military
response. As the 1991-92 'American Defense Annual' later put it: "Saddam
Hussein... proved to be a near perfect villian, and the coalition aligned
against him had a compelling 'casus belli'" (12). A ruthless military
dictator, infamous for gassing his own people, blitzkrieged the small,
peaceful nation of Kuwait in blatant violation of international law.
What's more, Saddam's Invasion resulted in Iraq's control of over a third
of the world's available oil reserves and "put his forces within striking
distance of one of the world's most critical resources, Saudi Arabia's oil
fields, making it necessary for the United States and other nations to act
to counter him, instead of just issuing protest statements" (13). As a
whole, through the Kuwaiti Invasion, Saddam had come to threaten half the
world's oil, a situation wholly intolerable to the oil-dependent West.
Between the Invasion and the beginning of the Gulf War, Iraq continued
to behave in a seemingly irrational manner that was inconsistent with its
own interests but favorable to Western interests.
In the wake of Saddam's overrun of Kuwait, international pressure, led
by the West, began to build on Iraq to withdraw. Immediately, U.N.
Resolution 660 was ratified which called for the unconditional withdrawal
of Iraq from Kuwait (14). Within days, U.S. military forces began flooding
into Saudi Arabia. With Saddam remaining intransigent, the United Nations
decided to impose international economic sanctions against Iraq. As Iraq
failed to respond, military forces from across the globe began flowing into
the Gulf along side the growing American build-up. On November 29th, with
a sizable Coalition force already in place, the U.N. okayed a resolution
for the forceful removal of Iraq from Kuwait by a U.S.-led international
Coalition should Saddam's forces not unilaterally leave by January 15,
1991. (15)
Saddam's intransigence as international pressure began to build made
little sense. It was apparent, given the scale of the American-led
military build-up in Saudi Arabia, that, beyond freeing Kuwait, the West
was preparing to use the Invasion of Kuwait as an excuse to destroy Iraq's
military potential and, in turn, the threat Saddam posed to Western
interests in the Middle East. Any sort of compromise or moderation on
Saddam's part could have easily undone Western attempts to organize
international support for a war and, in turn, resulted in substantial Iraqi
gains. In John Bulloch's and Harvey Morris' 'Saddam's War', it is pointed
out that:
"Had he (Saddam) contented himself with occupying the
disputed islands of Bubiyan and Warbah and that sector of the
Rumeileh oilfield which he claimed as his own, it is unlikely
the United Nations would have gone beyond the imposition of
unenforceable sanctions, or that the United States would have
dispatched a single soldier to the region... Had a puppet
government been left in charge of a nominally independent
Kuwait, it would eventually have received some recognition, at
least from the Arab world." (16)
Instead of moderation, however, Saddam remained almost completely
intransigent and belligerent toward the West. He persistently made clear
his unwillingness to be persuaded by Western intimidation. He declared
Kuwait to have always been a part of Iraq and let the world know that all
of Iraqi sovereignty- including Kuwait- would be militarily defended
against any hostile actions. Furthermore, Saddam called on moslems around
the world to rise up and launch a holy war, or 'jihad', against Western
imperialism. (17)
Saddam sometimes, and usually at the wrong times, failed to behave
according to the belligerent image he painted of himself.
Iraqi forces never preempted the build-up of the American-led Coalition
in Saudi Arabia. Saddam conveniently stood back as nations from all over
the world, particularly in the West, mobilized and imported a massive
military force. Yet, attacking while the Coalition was incomplete and
disorganized may have undermined the Coalition's ability to successfully
wage a war. Unfortunately, as is pointed out in the 1991-92 'American
Defense Annual': "It seems unlikely that future enemies will graciously
grant U.S. forces five months to prepare for battle" (18).
Even more inconsistent than failing to preempt was Saddam's release of
Western hostages. There can be little doubt that: "One act of great good
fortune was Saddam Hussein's decision to release his hostages, those human
shields whose continued presence in Iraq would have vastly complicated the
air war" (19). Specifically, Saddam made hostages out of the thousands of
Western civilians (including over 3000 Americans) who had been living in
Kuwait or Iraq when the Gulf Crisis broke out. He threatened to use them
as 'human shields' by placing them in strategic targets in order to deter
any approaching Coalition attack. These hostages became one of Saddam's
only major trump cards against a U.S.-led attack. It was apparent a
Coalition bombing campaign that would cost thousands of innocent Western
lives would have exceptionally high political costs for our leaders. In an
act of goodwill totally uncharacteristic of the 'Butcher of Baghdad',
however, Saddam released the hostages. The only major concession he made
before the Gulf War was profoundly self-contradictory in that it directly
undermined his stated intention to inflict as much damage and pain as
possible on the West. In fact, Saddam spared the lives of Westerners at
the cost of Iraqi lives later lost in unhampered Coalition bombings.
The deadline of January 15th eventually passed and the U.S.-Coalition
attacked the very next day. The Gulf War was underway as well as continued
inconsistencies and contradictions.
As General Powell correctly pointed out the following day, the
Coalition somehow 'caught Iraq off guard' and achieved tactical surprise in
its post-deadline air-attack (20). This, of course, is absurd. Going into
the Gulf War, Iraq had one of the most experienced and hardened militaries
in the world. It had just completed an almost decade-long, modern war with
Iran. Furthermore, Iraq was equipped with a sophisticated Soviet Cµ3I
network. To top it all off, Iraq had several months going into January
15th to prepare its defenses and a military response should war come. Yet,
Saddam's war-machine was somehow surprised by a *deadline*-attack. Upon
the initial wave of the air campaign there was little or no immediate Iraqi
response: no defensive black-out of Baghdad (something they had been
rehearsing), no immediate retaliatory SCUD missile strikes, and no Iraqi
air- or ground-counteroffensive. Fortunately for the Coalition, all its
planes ran into was well-lit targets, inept Iraqi air defenses, and some
sporadic dog-fights. Tactical surprise allowed the Coalition to swiftly
disable Saddam's war-machine with minimum associated costs.
During the air-campaign, the only significant counterattack from Iraq
was random SCUD missile attacks against Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Fortunately, however, chemical weapons were never involved. Of course, why
weren't they? It was not that Saddam lacked such weapons for in the War's
aftermath U.N. inspectors have found dozens of Al-Hussein chemical SCUDs
which survived Coalition bombings (21). Saddam decided not to use chemical
SCUDs even though such restraint contradicted both the threats he was
making and the image he was conveying prior to and during the Gulf War. If
Saddam really wished to spread the conflict and set-off a holy war as he
persistently claimed he would, hitting Israel with chemical SCUDs would
have been an ideal provocation. It is doubtful that Saddam feared Israeli
retaliation given that Iraq was already stomaching over two thousand
Coalition sorties a day and Israeli involvement was the intended goal. All
in all, it makes little sense that Saddam failed to use chemical SCUDs
during the Gulf War against Israel or any of Iraq's enemies, whereas he
gassed his own people only a couple of years before. (22)
In late February, the Coalition ground-offensive got underway, but
again no chemical weapons were involved. Apparently, Saddam disallowed the
use of any of the tens-of-thousands of chemical artillery shells and
chemical mines in the Iraqi arsenal (23). This is surprising given how
these weapons were employed with great success during the Iran-Iraq War
(24). The fact that chemical munitions were not used by the Iraqis is but
another inconsistency on the part of Saddam which was to the benefit of the
U.S. and the Coalition forces.
By March, Kuwait was repatriated and Saddam had managed to suffer a
defeat that seemed beyond human reasoning. With all said and done, the
U.S.-Coalition had succeeded in a total military 'rout' of Iraq's war-
hardened, well-equipped, million-man army and hardly got scratched in the
process. After six-weeks of Allied aerial bombardment involving upwards of
100,000 sorties and 141,000 tons of bombs, Saddam's vast war-machine was
left decimated at the cost of only a few dozen Coalition planes (25). Any
of Saddam's forces in Kuwait that escaped destruction during the Coalition
air-campaign proceeded to be encircled and destroyed in a 100-hour Allied
ground offensive. When the War was over, more than 100,000 Iraqi soldiers
had been killed, 300,000 were injured, and around 150,000 had been taken
prisoner (26). In causing this immense massacre, the Allies suffered only
468 casualties: 149 dead, 81 missing-in-action, and 238 wounded (27).
Through the Gulf War Saddam lost some 4000 tanks, 2000 artillery pieces,
2000 armored personnel carriers (APCs), 100 aircraft, and 80 ships (28).
Furthermore, Iraq's infrastructure suffered what the U.N. later described
as 'near-apocalyptic' damage (29). The Allies, on the other hand, lost
only 4 tanks, 1 artillery piece, 9 APCs, 44 aircraft, and 2 ships (30).
All in all, Saddam's defeat at the hands of the West was so drastic and
humiliating as to be utterly nonsensical.
With the Gulf War over, the West had reason to breathe a sigh of relief
at home. Fortunately, there had been no major anti-Western terrorist
attacks associated with the Crisis. Of course, why weren't there? The CIA
"picked up all the tell-tale signs of Iraq's ability to wage chemical
warfare and launch terrorist attacks around the Middle East and Europe...
Intelligence analysts are still scratching their heads, wondering why these
capabilities were not used (31)". In other words, Saddam refrained from
launching terrorist attacks just as he failed to wage chemical attacks even
though he was fully capable of and supposedly intending to do both. Thus,
since there was no terrorism, Saddam acted in a contradictory manner which,
once again, was favorable to the West.
In the wake of the Gulf War, one of the greatest inconsistencies of all
concerning Saddam's behavior has come to light. U.N. inspections following
the Gulf War ceasefire have revealed that Iraq's program to develop nuclear
weapons, code-named 'Project Babylon' (32), was far larger and more
successful than had ever been suspected in the West. In fact, it is today
believed that Iraq may have been less than a year away from having at least
a few crude nuclear weapons when it invaded Kuwait (33). Of course, if
Saddam was interested in taking on the West and fighting the "Mother of All
Battles", why did he make his challenge when he did? Why didn't he wait a
year until he had the Bomb? Why did Saddam invade Kuwait and fight a war
with the West before developing the ultimate means by which to fulfill his
grandiose ambitions?
-The Soviets-
Throughout the Persian Gulf Crisis the Soviets behaved as
inconsistently as Saddam's Iraq.
For the Gulf Crisis, Soviet foreign policy did an about-face.
Throughout most of the United Nation's history, Moscow had tried to
undermine any Western efforts to bring about international cooperation,
particularly if such cooperation was to somehow serve Western interests.
Yet, for the Gulf Crisis, this was not so. For the first time since World
War II the Soviets cooperated with the West in organizing an international
effort.
The effort they finally chose to support was blatantly in the West's
interest and against their own.
The oil-shock stemming from the Gulf Crisis was devastating to Western
economic vitality. The West desperately needed a way to resecure its
supply of cheap oil from the Persian Gulf by freeing Kuwait and eliminating
the Iraqi threat. Without the okay of the Soviets and international
support this may never have been possible and the West's economy may very
well have been plunged into depression.
For the Soviets, on the other hand, higher oil-prices stemming from the
Gulf Crisis was a blessing. At the time, Soviet Russia was the world's
largest producer and second largest exporter of oil. Hence, the sharp rise
in oil prices meant windfall profits of hard foreign currency- something
the Soviets greatly needed. Given the price at which oil topped-out during
the Crisis, the Soviets could have hoped to increase their hard-currency
earnings by nearly $40 billion a year. (34)
Beyond oil interests, Saddam Hussein's Iraq was a valuable ally and
military client which the Soviets should have wanted to keep.
By 1990, the Soviets had a long-standing and deeply-vested relationship
with Iraq. In 1972, Moscow and Baghdad signed a 'Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation' (35). Over the next two decades the Soviets poured thousands
of military 'advisers' and other specialists into Iraq who trained
Baghdad's general staff and planning officers as well as organized its
intelligence services (36). Soviet involvement in Iraq became particularly
deep after Saddam Hussein came to power in 1979. Guided by a Stalinist
philosophy, Saddam wanted to model Iraq after the Soviet military state
(37). He affirmed his commitment to Moscow when he came to power by
signing an agreement with Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov on military
cooperation and strategic consultation (38). After making the agreement,
the Soviets helped Saddam carry out a large-scale campaign to consolidate
power within Iraq and become a regional military superpower. Reflecting
Moscow's involvement, eight military facilities were constructed in Iraq
for Soviet use including both air bases and naval ports (39). All in all,
by the Kuwaiti Invasion, the Soviet Union had invested a great deal of
time, energy, and resources in the construction of Saddam's totalitarian
regime and modern war-machine- an investment they likely meant to make good
on.
In developing its massive war-machine, Iraq became an ideal Soviet
military clientele state. During the 1980's Iraq became the world's
largest importer of arms. It is estimated that between 1980 and 1990
Saddam spent some $100 billion dollars on military equipment (that compares
to just under $70 billion spent on arms by Britian or France during the
same period) (40). Since 90 percent of Iraq's military was bought from the
Soviets, it should be apparent just how valuable a customer Saddam was to
Moscow.
Since Iraq purchased most of its arms from the Soviets on credit, it
was in Moscow's interest to maintain Saddam's regime and Iraq's economic
vitality. Going into the Gulf Crisis, Baghdad owed Moscow some $80
billion. For 1990 alone, the Soviets were expecting to receive $2 billion
from Iraq (41). Given the seeming economic distress in Soviet Russia,
preserving Iraq's economic potential should have been important to them.
In a nutshell, the Soviets should not have wanted to turn their back on
Iraq during the Gulf Crisis. As 'Times' columnist A.M. Rosenthal pointed
out at the time, doing so meant that:
"Moscow will lose its only remaining ally in the area. Also:
its best customer for weapons. Also: the military and political
prestige it invested in Saddam Hussein for so long." (42)
The principal reason Moscow forged a close relationship with Baghdad
and made such a deep military commitment is because Iraq has tremendous
geopolitical strategic value. Iraq is at the heart of the Persian Gulf and
the richest oil-region in the world. Thus, it is a focal point not only of
the Arab world, but also of vital Western energy interests. A foothold in
Iraq enhanced Moscow's influence over other Arab nations and gave the
Soviets access to the aquilles heel of the oil-dependent West.
Because of Iraq's strategic value, it was widely believed the Soviets
would never let the West attack and defeat Saddam Hussein. Such a scenario
entailed a shift in the regional balance of power that compromised Soviet
interests and benefitted the West. Just prior to the Gulf War, 'Aviation
Week and Space Technology' reported:
"...the destruction of Iraq's military, if it came to that,
would augment the strategic weight of Israel and Iran. This is
not in Soviet interests." (43)
At the Hoover Institute, a national defense think-tank, experts believed
that the Soviets would "do everything in their power to keep that man
(Saddam) in there... They do not want that part of
the world dominated by |