The Persian Gulf Deception Part II
us" (44).
All in all, Moscow had vested interests in its relationship with
Baghdad such that they should have stood behind, or at least sought to
protect, Saddam Hussein's Iraq during the Gulf Crisis. Yet, they did not.
In fact, they opened the way for the West to launch a war against their
valuable Iraqi ally:
"The importance of Soviet cooperation cannot be overstated.
If the Soviets had pursued their traditional policy of blocking
agreements at the United Nations and defending their protÛgÛs in
the Middle East, not only would united action have been
impossible but fear of provoking a superpower confrontation
might well have deterred the United States from acting." (45)
Although at least some contemplation would have been expected, the
Soviets turned their back on Saddam and helped out the West immediately and
without reservation. On the day of the Invasion, American Secretary of
State James Baker was visiting his Soviet counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze,
in Siberia. On news of the Invasion, the two got together, and within just
a couple of hours they had worked out the draft wording for U.N.
Resolution 660 which called for an immediate, unconditional Iraqi
withdrawal from Kuwait. (46)
As Western forces began piling into the Gulf, Moscow failed to use its
diplomatic leverage over Saddam to remove Iraq from Kuwait. This, of
course, makes little sense given what the Soviets had to gain from
preserving Iraq. Yet, while a diplomatic solution was still possible
before Iraq was destroyed by Western military force, the Soviets sat on
their hands. If they were interested in seeing a peaceful resolution to
the Crisis they should have been able to produce one since the Soviet Union
was Iraq's principal political- and military-supporter. It is apparent
that: "The Soviet Union is the one power that could have brought Iraq to
terms early on if Moscow had really clenched its fist" (47).
In fact, Saddam may have backed down if only the Soviets informed
Baghdad of their willingness to let the U.S.-led Coalition attack. In
'Saddam's War', the authors revealed:
"In Baghdad, officials told us that they had their links to
Moscow, and they were quite certain that at the Helsinki summit
in mid-September the influence of Soviet military thinking made
Gorbachev hold back from any endorsement of military action
against Iraq if sanctions proved ineffective. Whether or not
this was true, the Iraqis firmly believed that it was and that
Soviet generals would prevent any attack on them. This
perception undoubtedly influenced the Baghdad government's
policy of brinksmanship." (48)
As war approached the Soviets actually helped prepare the U.S.-led
effort to destroy Iraq. They fed the West important codes and intelligence
on the Iraqi military which simplified the Coalition's offensive (49).
Hence, the Soviets went extraordinarily out of their way to facilitate a
Western-led attack against their valuable ally.
-Part II: The Deception-
What can be drawn from the above inconsistencies and contradictions in
Iraqi and Soviet behavior? Quite simply, it appears something seriously
afoul may have been underlying the Persian Gulf Crisis. 'Contra'-'diction'
entails that something is contrary to what it appears to mean. This is the
essence of a lie. The contradictions associated with the Gulf Crisis
indicate that it may have been some sort of lie- the opposite of what it
appeared to be.
There was a prevailing and consistent theme to the contradictory
behavior of Saddam Hussein's Iraq and the Soviet Union during the Gulf
Crisis. Both nations persistently acted in a way that facilitated a
sensational Western Gulf War victory over Iraq. If, as part of a large-
scale deception, Soviet Russia and Saddam's Iraq were working together to
bring about the Gulf War and have Iraq decisively lose to the West, then
the seemingly inconsistent and irrational behavior of Bagdhad and Moscow
makes sense.
Saddam's Invasion of Kuwait was an ideal provocation to lure the West
into launching a war against Iraq. By 1990, the increasing threat posed by
Saddam's radical anti-Western policies, growing military power, and nuclear
weapons development program, most likely had the West seeking an excuse to
stop Iraq short. As Saddam began to make belligerent threats, increasingly
directed at Kuwait, the West was given ample time to muse the possibility
of fighting a needed war against Iraq. When Saddam actually invaded
Kuwait, there was a blatant violation of international law and half of the
world's known oil reserves came under an Iraqi threat- the West received
both an ideal excuse and an unavoidable provocation to wage a mitigating
war against Saddam's military empire.
Following the Invasion, the Soviets made it easy for the West to launch
a war against Iraq. With the U.S. Secretary of State already in Russia,
Moscow was able to immediately cooperate and the initial U.N. call for
Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait resulted. The reason the Soviets didn't take
time to contemplate their response is because they had preplanned it. As
the U.S. worked with the international community to set the stage for a
full-scale war against Iraq, the Soviets continued to cooperate including
their okay for the use of military force against their Iraqi ally. As the
deadline for war approached, Moscow made sure not to use diplomatic
pressure to get Saddam to back down because the intent was to make way for
a Western attack.
Going into the January 15th deadline, Saddam made sure the West could
go through with the War it desired by remaining intransigent and
belligerent. Even as it became apparent that the Coalition force was more
than large enough to overwhelm Iraq, Saddam failed to compromise on Kuwait.
Saddam took steps prior to the Gulf War to open the way for a
successful Coalition attack with minimum potential costs for the West. By
failing to preempt the build-up of forces in Saudi Arabia, Iraq made it
easy for the U.S.-led Coalition to achieve a military superiority and fully
organize itself, thus facilitating Western success. On top of this, by
releasing his Western 'human shield' hostages, Saddam removed a substantial
mitigating factor to a Coalition air-attack and greatly reduced the
potential costs the West would face in launching a war, both in terms of
Western lives and consequent political costs.
For the initial Coalition air-attack, Saddam left his forces off-guard
and unprepared, allowing the Allies the advantage of tactical surprise.
Targets were left vulnerable, no initial military response was prepared or
executed, and defensive responses were subdued, thus the door was left open
for the the Allies to swiftly disable the potential of Saddam's war-
machine. This gave the West an inflated sense of technical and strategic
superiority, something which would be further fed throughout the War.
As the War progressed and Saddam's empire was being decimated, Iraq
refrained from using chemical weapons so that the West's Gulf victory would
be clean-cut and total. Saddam made sure not to hit Israel with chemical
SCUDs in that such a provocation would have surely elicited a potent
Israeli military response. Israeli involvement in the Gulf War could have
easily led to a breakup of the Coalition and possibly spawned a larger
regional conflict. By keeping chemical weapons off the battlefield, Saddam
minimized Coalition casualties and kept the conflict from escalating in a
way which could have led to a breakdown in international support for the
War and/or threatened the Coalition's cohesion. All in all, by not using
chemical weapons, Saddam minimized Western losses- both in terms of lives
and associated political costs, thus insuring that the victory handed to
the West was total.
Throughout the whole affair there was no associated terrorism so that
the deception would go smoothly and Soviet involvement would remain
undiscovered. Extensive evidence has been uncovered which indicates that
Moscow has been behind much of international terrorism (50). Thus, there
is reason to believe that, prior to the Gulf Crisis, the Kremlin may have
put out some sort of restraining order on both Saddam and international
terrorist organizations in general. This would have been done for two
reasons. First off, it was important to constrain hostilities as much as
possible to the Persian Gulf region. Aggravating other tensions, such as
between the Arabs and Israel, would have threatened both international
support for the Gulf War and the exceptional nature of the West's victory.
Secondly, terrorism could have opened up linkages to Moscow that Western
intelligence might discover and trace, thus leading to an uncovering of the
deception.
When the Gulf War ended and Iraq had been forced from Kuwait, Saddam
had managed to achieve exactly what he intended from the start. He
suffered a drastic, humiliating defeat while inflicting minimal damage on
the U.S.-led Coalition. Thus, the West was handed a sensational, total
victory in the Gulf.
As for the surprising extent of Iraq's nuclear program, Saddam
challenged the West before he had the Bomb because 'Project Babylon' was
most valuable as bait for a Western attack. Should Saddam have invaded
Kuwait once Iraq had nuclear weapons, the odds are that there never would
have been a Gulf War, and, if there was, it wouldn't have been a 'great
victory' for the West.
If it seems difficult to believe that Saddam might have staged the Gulf
Crisis under Kremlin order, simply consider the alternative: How could have
Saddam invaded Kuwait without Moscow's knowledge and consent?
In a New Republic article, 'Virtual Ally: What's the Soviet Game in the
Gulf', which came out just after the Crisis erupted, Edward Jay Epstein, an
expert on Soviet intelligence, asked the provocative question:
"Did the USSR have advance knowledge of well-designed Iraqi
plans to invade Kuwait? After all, unlike the United States,
the Soviet Union had military advisers in Iraq attached to the
helicopter, tank, logistic, and radar units used for the
invasion, and the KGB presumably had developed sources from the
three generations of Iraqi staff and planning officers trained
by Moscow?" (51)
As for consent, according to Claudia Wright of 'Foreign Affairs', in
the 1980's the U.S. State Department thought of Saddam Hussein as "so
beholden to the Soviet Union as to be incapable of autonomous foreign
policy" (52). Given how dependent Iraq was on the Soviets- particularly in
building up and maintaining its military strength, and given Saddam's
Stalinist, pro-Soviet mind-set, it's unlikely Baghdad would have ever
pulled-off a stunt as reckless and potentially costly as invading Kuwait
without first seeking Moscow's approval. This is particularly true since
it would have been nearly impossible to develop and carry out such plans
without the Soviets noticing.
All in all, there is good reason to believe California Senator Bill
Richardson who remarked, "there is little doubt that the Soviets were
apprised of the invasion before it happened, helped plan it and approved
it. There is no way communist puppet Saddam Hussein would have given the
order to invade Kuwait if it were not sanctioned by Gorbachev (53)."
-Part III: Confirmation-
The idea that the Gulf Crisis was an intentional deception and that
Moscow was fundamentally behind the whole affair is confirmed by some
directly incriminating evidence.
There was strong evidence that the Soviets were involved with Iraq's
Invasion of Kuwait. First off, two weeks prior to the Invasion, Colonel
General Albert Makashov, former commander of the Volga-Urals Command, went
to Baghdad as a Soviet 'military counseler' (54). Since Iraq's military
command would have had difficulty handling an operation as logistically
complex as the Kuwaiti Invasion, there is reason to believe Makashov,
and/or other Russian commanders, oversaw the Invasion. This is
substantiated by the fact that there were Soviet military advisers attached
to the Iraqi helicopter, tank, logistic, and radar units used for the
Invasion of Kuwait (55). Also, 1200 Iraqi military personnel were being
trained by Soviet specialists at Odessa, inside the Soviet Union, around
the time of the Invasion (56). Further evidence of Moscow's complicity in
the Invasion stems from the fact that the Soviets sold or transferred
military spare parts to Saddam for at least five days following the August
2nd Invasion (57). What's more, when the U.S. began surveillance over
Kuwait in the wake of the Invasion, there were indications that Soviet
technicians helped the Iraqi air force jam intelligence and eavesdropping
on flights by American aircraft (58).
There was also strong evidence of Soviet complicity with Iraq
throughout the Gulf War. On numerous occasions allied forces heard Russian
language communiques on Iraqi military radios. Following the War,
returning U.S. soldiers said they saw evidence in the field that Soviet
advisers were working along with Iraqi forces. According to F. Andy
Messing, executive director of the National Defense Council Foundation,
there were over two dozen documented cases that showed Soviet involvement
in Iraq during the Gulf War. "The Soviets were all over the place", Messing
reported, Soviet advisers "continued to tune radars, fix tanks and planes
and advise (Iraqi) combat units down to the battalion level". In a Senate
Foreign Relations briefing paper published February 21st, 1991, it was
reported that: "For two days in February, Russian language and voices were
communicating over Iraqi military networks". Furthermore, the Soviets
repositioned satellites over the Gulf region and were "supplying targeting
information to the Iraqis for mobile missile launchers". The report
outlined how Soviet advisers were "helping Iraqis fire SCUD missiles at
Israel and Saudi Arabia". On February 25th, two days after the ground war
began, former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said during a BBC
interview that the Soviet Union was still supplying arms to Iraq. Despite
the strong evidence of Soviet complicity, the Kremlin denied any
involvement with Iraq and assured the West that its advisers and personnel
were pulled out soon after Iraq invaded Kuwait. (59)
All in all, there appears to be sufficient indirect and direct evidence
to believe that the Persian Gulf Crisis was a Soviet-engineered deception.
The inconsistencies and contradictions in Iraqi and Soviet behavior
throughout the Gulf Crisis build a strong circumstantial case for a
deception in the Gulf. Based upon the direct evidence above, there seems
little doubt that the Soviets were both aware of and involved in the
Invasion of Kuwait. Furthermore, it is clear that the Soviets
underhandedly backed the Iraqis throughout the Gulf War. The logical
explanation for the directly incriminating evidence is that the
circumstantial case is correct. Moscow and Baghdad worked together to
create a large-scale deception in the Persian Gulf.
-Note-
Undoubtedly, Western intelligence had some idea of Soviet
involvement in the Gulf. However, their interpretation of the
connection was most likely misled. Backed-up by reassuring
Soviet excuses, Western analysts would downplay the importance
and implications of any Soviet involvement. This is because the
West would either have to accept that Saddam was a fool and they
were winning or they were the fools and would end up losing in a
most tragic way. Western arrogance and fear would take over
from there, something the Soviets could count on. (60)
-Part IV: The Strategy-
Why would Moscow have had Iraq stage the Gulf War and its
own defeat? Why would have Saddam Hussein gone along with such
a humiliating plan? Because the Gulf Crisis may have served as
an important deception to set the stage for a successful
surprise attack by the East against the West and, in turn,
totalitarian domination of the world. Because Saddam Hussein,
as a reward for his current sacrifices, may eventually receive
the power to 're-create the glories that were Babylon and
Mesopotamia' and then have dominion over them. By accepting
defeat in the "Mother of All 'Battles'", Saddam may have paved
the way for totalitarianism to win the Mother of All 'Wars':
World War III.
As a deception, the Gulf Crisis would have served important military
and political strategic aims of Moscow and its Eastern counterparts.
In that it is not popularly perceived or expected, Russia, in concert
with other military powers of the East, may be pursuing a grand strategy
for world domination which involves launching a surprise third world war
against the West (61). The central idea of any such strategy would be to
instill a false sense of security in the West. Such a false sense of
security will minimimize the West's military potential and maximize Western
vulnerability. This is true for two main reasons. First off, with no
sense of a threat, the West will reduce its military preparedness.
Secondly, upon attack, the East would have the advantage of surprise- a key
ingredient to success in a war involving rapid mass destruction.
The principal way in which Moscow may be trying to instill a false
sense of security in the West is deceit. By intentionally creating and
exaggerating the image of weakness and incapacitation, along with pursuing
cooperative, peace-oriented policies favorable to the West, the perceived
Soviet military threat has been virtually eliminated, America has come to
trust its long-time Russian foe, and Western arrogance has been inflated to
blinding proportions. Consequently, a tremendous, potentially false sense
of security has developed in the West entailing a high degree of
vulnerability.
If, indeed, the Gulf crisis was a deception, then it was tailor-made
for a strategy as outlined above. First off, by creating a serious
international crisis in which critical Western interests were at stake,
Moscow gave itself the opportunity to cooperate with the West in a manner
that seemed to reflect a progressive, peace-oriented change of heart. This
significantly fostered Western trust. Secondly, since the West was allowed
such a substantial victory over Iraq, and because Saddam's military state
was of Soviet-design, the West's sense of superiority to the East was
significantly inflated by the Gulf War, particularly with respect to
military capabilities (62). Third, since Moscow turned its back on a
valuable military ally during the Gulf Crisis, the image that Russia is
incapacitated and increasingly interested in peaceful coexistence was
reinforced and exagerrated. Lastly, on a broader level, the isolation and
utter military defeat of Saddam Hussein's Iraq served as a symbolic end to
the power of military totalitarian regimes.
A provocative example of how Western trust may have been directly
exploited by the Soviets for successfully waging a surprise third world war
can be seen in interrelated developments surrounding the Gulf Crisis and
the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. In November of 1990,
during the middle of the Gulf Crisis, the United States signed the CFE
treaty with the Soviet Union. The treaty entails major reductions in both
sides' European theatre conventional forces into 1994.
The CFE treaty is highly favorable to the Soviets in the context of
their initiating a third world war with a preemptive, nuclear surprise
attack against the West. The reason this is so has to do with the fact
that the United States is an ocean away from the European continent,
whereas the Soviet Union is directly attached to it. Following a Soviet
nuclear attack, America would be unable to reinforce its European allies
because the necessary ports, airfields, men and equipment will have been
destroyed. Consequently, it would be relatively easy for Russia to
reorganize the Soviet army and march across Western Europe (63). Thus, the
U.S. force withdrawals under the CFE treaty may be benefitting Russia if,
indeed, a nuclear surprise attack is being planned.
The Gulf Crisis sped-up and augmented the U.S. pullout from Europe. A
substantial portion of the half-million soldiers and military equipment
that poured into Saudi Arabia for the Gulf War was pulled out of Western
Europe (64). For instance, half of America's mechanized divisions in
Europe were drawn into the Gulf. From Germany alone, more than 70,000
soldiers and 40,000 tanks, artillery pieces, and other equipment were moved
to Saudi Arabia (65). Following the Gulf War, with superpower trust
elevated, many of the forces pulled from Western Europe returned to the
U.S. rather than the European theatre because it was to be removed by 1994
under the terms of the CFE treaty anyways (66).
The Gulf Crisis, along with technicalities in the CFE treaty, was used
by the Soviets to stockpile military equipment behind the Ural mountains-
an important preparatory measure prior to waging a surprise attack- without
alarming the West. Just before signing the CFE agreement during the middle
of the Gulf Crisis, the Soviets scurried over 70,000 pieces of military
equipment east of the Ural mountains (according to Moscow's count) (67).
On top of a large number of planes, helicopters, and armoured combat
vehicles, 20,000 tanks and over 34,000 artillery pieces were moved. This
accounts for half the tanks and two-thirds of the artillery the Soviets had
prepositioned against Western Europe up to that time. Placing the
equipment behind the Urals protects it from being counted under the CFE
treaty limits. It also protects it from Western missile and/or air attacks
and puts the equipment in a strategic position for later use in a re-
conquest of Eastern Europe and offensive on Western Europe. In a Februaury
opposing-editorial to the Wall Street Journal, the Deputy Director of the
Arms Control Association, Jack Mendelsohn, commented that: "...placing
these weapons in storage behind the Urals says something important about
Soviet intentions regarding a surprise attack or general war in Europe"
(68). NATO's supreme commander (retired: 6/92), General John Galvin, had
this to say about the stockpile: "My concern is that this equipment is
there for future use. It's big, big numbers. But I know it's just sitting
there in the snow- tanks and airplanes side by side, sometimes for
kilometers at a time" (69). For the most part, however, the West
disregarded the provocative Soviet move. Western suspicions were minimized
due to growing superpower trust, the distracting events in the Gulf, and
the idea that the Soviets may have simply been seeking to circumvent the
CFE treaty.
As can be readily surmised, the general idea of the Gulf Crisis and
Moscow's strategy in general may involve seducing the West with lies in
order to successfully wage a surprise third world war. It may be that
Gorbachev and Saddam are seeking to achieve long-run victory by allowing
their own short-run defeats. The West seems to have been easily seduced by
what may prove to be the staged death of Eastern military totalitarianism
and an illusory global victory of Western society. Such a lie is simply
too tempting for indulgent, proud Westerners to refuse. As a consequence
of this, Western vulnerability is at a post-war extreme and its military
potential has been significantly compromised. Thus, the path may have been
opened for an all-out surprise attack from the East.
-Conclusion-
Summarily, there is substantial reason to believe the Gulf Crisis was
not what it appeared to be. In fact, it may have been the total opposite
of what it seemed- a total lie. Instead of being a 'great victory', as
General Schwarzkopf believes, the Gulf War may have been a deception which
is being used toward the utter defeat of the West and global victory of
Eastern totalitarianism.
A logical explanation for the pervasive inconsistencies and
contradictions in Iraqi and Soviet behavior throughout the Gulf Crisis and
Gulf War is that the whole affair may have been some sort of staged
deception. It is possible that Saddam invaded Kuwait under Kremlin order
with the sole intention of provoking a war with the West. By cooperating
with the West in an unprecedented manner, the Soviets opened the way for
the Gulf War. Once war came, Saddam did what it took to decisively lose.
The upshot is that Moscow and Baghdad underhandedly worked together to hand
the West an illusory Gulf victory.
The purpose behind such a deception would likely involve an overall
Eastern strategy to dominate the world by fighting and winning a third
world war. Saddam stomached a humiliating defeat in order to augment a
false sense of security in the West and help Soviet Russia completely win
over Western trust. This, in turn, has opened the way for Moscow to dupe
the West into lowering its guard, thus creating an opportunity for the East
to launch a successful surprise attack.
Due in large part to the Gulf Crisis, the world may today be on the
brink of what would undoubtedly be the the Mother of All Wars. It is
rather apparent that an attack from the East would today be a total
surprise. Furthermore, in the wake of its Gulf 'victory', America has
increasingly let down its military guard, particularly against a Russian
nuclear attack. {For instance, America's strategic command has been
disbanded, a sizable part of the U.S. ICBM arsenal has been deactivated,
many attack-warning satellites and radar installations have been shutdown,
and almost all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons abroad have been pulled home-
including those which were on naval vessels (70).} All in all, the proper
conditions have developed for the East to launch a successful surprise
attack against the West. The Persian Gulf Crisis may have been a seductive
lie which was created toward this ultimate End.
"The harvest in the Mother of Battles has succeeded...
the greater harvest and its yield will be in the time to come..."
{comment by Saddam Hussein following the Gulf War}
(71)
(Notes and References to this paper are in the next document.)
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