The Persian Gulf Deception Part II

 us" (44).

     All in all,  Moscow had  vested  interests  in  its  relationship  with

 Baghdad  such  that  they  should have stood behind,  or at least sought to

 protect, Saddam Hussein's Iraq during the Gulf Crisis.  Yet,  they did not.

 In  fact,  they  opened  the way for the West to launch a war against their

 valuable Iraqi ally:

          "The importance of Soviet cooperation cannot  be  overstated.

       If  the Soviets had pursued their traditional policy of blocking

       agreements at the United Nations and defending their protÛgÛs in

       the  Middle  East,  not  only  would  united  action  have  been

       impossible  but  fear  of  provoking  a superpower confrontation

       might well have deterred the United States from acting." (45)

     Although at least some contemplation  would  have  been  expected,  the

 Soviets turned their back on Saddam and helped out the West immediately and

 without  reservation.  On  the  day of the Invasion,  American Secretary of

 State James Baker was visiting his Soviet counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze,

 in Siberia.  On news of the Invasion, the two got together, and within just

 a couple  of  hours  they  had  worked  out  the  draft  wording  for  U.N.

 Resolution   660  which  called  for  an  immediate,   unconditional  Iraqi

 withdrawal from Kuwait. (46)

     As Western forces began piling into the Gulf,  Moscow failed to use its

 diplomatic  leverage  over  Saddam  to  remove Iraq from Kuwait.  This,  of

 course,  makes little sense  given  what  the  Soviets  had  to  gain  from

 preserving  Iraq.  Yet,  while  a  diplomatic  solution  was still possible

 before Iraq was destroyed by Western military force,  the  Soviets  sat  on

 their  hands.  If  they  were interested in seeing a peaceful resolution to

 the Crisis they should have been able to produce one since the Soviet Union

 was Iraq's principal political-  and  military-supporter.  It  is  apparent

 that:  "The  Soviet  Union is the one power that could have brought Iraq to

 terms early on if Moscow had really clenched its fist" (47).

     In fact,  Saddam may have backed down  if  only  the  Soviets  informed

 Baghdad  of  their  willingness  to  let the U.S.-led Coalition attack.  In

 'Saddam's War', the authors revealed:

          "In Baghdad,  officials told us that they had their links  to

       Moscow,  and they were quite certain that at the Helsinki summit

       in mid-September the influence of Soviet military thinking  made

       Gorbachev  hold  back  from  any  endorsement of military action

       against Iraq if sanctions proved  ineffective.  Whether  or  not

       this  was true,  the Iraqis firmly believed that it was and that

       Soviet  generals  would  prevent  any  attack  on   them.   This

       perception   undoubtedly  influenced  the  Baghdad  government's

       policy of brinksmanship." (48)

     As war approached the Soviets  actually  helped  prepare  the  U.S.-led

 effort to destroy Iraq.  They fed the West important codes and intelligence

 on  the  Iraqi  military  which  simplified the Coalition's offensive (49).

 Hence,  the Soviets went extraordinarily out of their way to  facilitate  a

 Western-led attack against their valuable ally.

                          -Part II:  The Deception-

     What  can be drawn from the above inconsistencies and contradictions in

 Iraqi and Soviet behavior?  Quite simply,  it appears  something  seriously

 afoul may have been underlying the Persian Gulf Crisis.  'Contra'-'diction'

 entails that something is contrary to what it appears to mean.  This is the

 essence  of  a  lie.  The  contradictions  associated  with the Gulf Crisis

 indicate that it may have been some sort of lie- the opposite  of  what  it

 appeared to be.

     There  was  a  prevailing  and  consistent  theme  to the contradictory

 behavior of Saddam Hussein's Iraq and the  Soviet  Union  during  the  Gulf

 Crisis.  Both  nations  persistently  acted  in  a  way  that facilitated a

 sensational Western Gulf War victory over Iraq.  If,  as part of  a  large-

 scale  deception,  Soviet Russia and Saddam's Iraq were working together to

 bring about the Gulf War and have Iraq decisively lose to  the  West,  then

 the  seemingly  inconsistent  and irrational behavior of Bagdhad and Moscow

 makes sense.

     Saddam's Invasion of Kuwait was an ideal provocation to lure  the  West

 into launching a war against Iraq.  By 1990, the increasing threat posed by

 Saddam's radical anti-Western policies, growing military power, and nuclear

 weapons development program,  most likely had the West seeking an excuse to

 stop Iraq short.  As Saddam began to make belligerent threats, increasingly

 directed at Kuwait,  the West was given ample time to muse the  possibility

 of  fighting  a  needed  war  against  Iraq.  When  Saddam actually invaded

 Kuwait,  there was a blatant violation of international law and half of the

 world's  known  oil  reserves came under an Iraqi threat- the West received

 both an ideal excuse and an unavoidable provocation to  wage  a  mitigating

 war against Saddam's military empire.

     Following the Invasion, the Soviets made it easy for the West to launch

 a  war  against Iraq.  With the U.S.  Secretary of State already in Russia,

 Moscow was able to immediately cooperate and  the  initial  U.N.  call  for

 Iraq  to withdraw from Kuwait resulted.  The reason the Soviets didn't take

 time to contemplate their response is because they had  preplanned  it.  As

 the  U.S.  worked  with  the international community to set the stage for a

 full-scale war against Iraq,  the Soviets continued to cooperate  including

 their  okay for the use of military force against their Iraqi ally.  As the

 deadline for war  approached,  Moscow  made  sure  not  to  use  diplomatic

 pressure  to get Saddam to back down because the intent was to make way for

 a Western attack.

     Going into the January 15th deadline,  Saddam made sure the West  could

 go   through  with  the  War  it  desired  by  remaining  intransigent  and

 belligerent.  Even as it became apparent that the Coalition force was  more

 than large enough to overwhelm Iraq, Saddam failed to compromise on Kuwait.

     Saddam  took  steps  prior  to  the  Gulf  War  to  open  the way for a

 successful Coalition attack with minimum potential costs for the  West.  By

 failing  to  preempt  the build-up of forces in Saudi Arabia,  Iraq made it

 easy for the U.S.-led Coalition to achieve a military superiority and fully

 organize itself,  thus facilitating Western success.  On top  of  this,  by

 releasing his Western 'human shield' hostages, Saddam removed a substantial

 mitigating  factor  to  a  Coalition  air-attack  and  greatly  reduced the

 potential costs the West would face in launching a war,  both in  terms  of

 Western lives and consequent political costs.

     For the initial Coalition air-attack,  Saddam left his forces off-guard

 and unprepared,  allowing the Allies the advantage  of  tactical  surprise.

 Targets were left vulnerable,  no initial military response was prepared or

 executed, and defensive responses were subdued, thus the door was left open

 for the the Allies to  swiftly  disable  the  potential  of  Saddam's  war-

 machine.  This  gave  the West an inflated sense of technical and strategic

 superiority, something which would be further fed throughout the War.

     As the War progressed and Saddam's empire  was  being  decimated,  Iraq

 refrained from using chemical weapons so that the West's Gulf victory would

 be  clean-cut  and total.  Saddam made sure not to hit Israel with chemical

 SCUDs in that such a  provocation  would  have  surely  elicited  a  potent

 Israeli  military response.  Israeli involvement in the Gulf War could have

 easily led to a breakup of the Coalition  and  possibly  spawned  a  larger

 regional conflict.  By keeping chemical weapons off the battlefield, Saddam

 minimized  Coalition  casualties and kept the conflict from escalating in a

 way which could have led to a breakdown in international  support  for  the

 War  and/or threatened the Coalition's cohesion.  All in all,  by not using

 chemical weapons,  Saddam minimized Western losses- both in terms of  lives

 and  associated  political costs,  thus insuring that the victory handed to

 the West was total.

     Throughout the whole affair there was no associated terrorism  so  that

 the  deception  would  go  smoothly  and  Soviet  involvement  would remain

 undiscovered.  Extensive evidence has been uncovered which  indicates  that

 Moscow  has been behind much of international terrorism (50).  Thus,  there

 is reason to believe that,  prior to the Gulf Crisis,  the Kremlin may have

 put  out  some  sort  of restraining order on both Saddam and international

 terrorist organizations in general.  This would  have  been  done  for  two

 reasons.  First  off,  it was important to constrain hostilities as much as

 possible to the Persian Gulf region.  Aggravating other tensions,  such  as

 between  the  Arabs  and  Israel,  would have threatened both international

 support for the Gulf War and the exceptional nature of the West's  victory.

 Secondly,  terrorism  could  have opened up linkages to Moscow that Western

 intelligence might discover and trace, thus leading to an uncovering of the


     When the Gulf War ended and Iraq had been forced  from  Kuwait,  Saddam

 had  managed  to  achieve  exactly  what  he  intended  from the start.  He

 suffered a drastic,  humiliating defeat while inflicting minimal damage  on

 the  U.S.-led  Coalition.  Thus,  the West was handed a sensational,  total

 victory in the Gulf.

     As  for  the  surprising  extent  of  Iraq's  nuclear  program,  Saddam

 challenged  the  West  before he had the Bomb because 'Project Babylon' was

 most valuable as bait for a Western  attack.  Should  Saddam  have  invaded

 Kuwait  once Iraq had nuclear weapons,  the odds are that there never would

 have been a Gulf War,  and,  if there was,  it wouldn't have been a  'great

 victory' for the West.

     If it seems difficult to believe that Saddam might have staged the Gulf

 Crisis under Kremlin order, simply consider the alternative: How could have

 Saddam invaded Kuwait without Moscow's knowledge and consent?

     In a New Republic article, 'Virtual Ally: What's the Soviet Game in the

 Gulf', which came out just after the Crisis erupted, Edward Jay Epstein, an

 expert on Soviet intelligence, asked the provocative question:

          "Did the USSR have advance knowledge of  well-designed  Iraqi

       plans  to  invade Kuwait?  After all,  unlike the United States,

       the Soviet Union had military advisers in Iraq attached  to  the

       helicopter,  tank,  logistic,  and  radar  units  used  for  the

       invasion,  and the KGB presumably had developed sources from the

       three  generations  of Iraqi staff and planning officers trained

       by Moscow?" (51)

     As for consent,  according to Claudia Wright of 'Foreign  Affairs',  in

 the  1980's  the  U.S.  State  Department  thought of Saddam Hussein as "so

 beholden to the Soviet Union as  to  be  incapable  of  autonomous  foreign

 policy" (52).  Given how dependent Iraq was on the Soviets- particularly in

 building  up  and  maintaining  its  military strength,  and given Saddam's

 Stalinist,  pro-Soviet mind-set,  it's unlikely  Baghdad  would  have  ever

 pulled-off  a  stunt  as reckless and potentially costly as invading Kuwait

 without first seeking Moscow's approval.  This is particularly  true  since

 it  would  have  been nearly impossible to develop and carry out such plans

 without the Soviets noticing.

     All in all,  there is good reason to believe  California  Senator  Bill

 Richardson  who  remarked,  "there  is  little  doubt that the Soviets were

 apprised of the invasion before it happened,  helped plan it  and  approved

 it.  There  is  no way communist puppet Saddam Hussein would have given the

 order to invade Kuwait if it were not sanctioned by Gorbachev (53)."

                          -Part III:  Confirmation-

     The idea that the Gulf Crisis was an  intentional  deception  and  that

 Moscow  was  fundamentally  behind  the  whole  affair is confirmed by some

 directly incriminating evidence.

     There was strong evidence that the Soviets were  involved  with  Iraq's

 Invasion  of Kuwait.  First off,  two weeks prior to the Invasion,  Colonel

 General Albert Makashov, former commander of the Volga-Urals Command,  went

 to  Baghdad  as  a Soviet 'military counseler' (54).  Since Iraq's military

 command would have had difficulty handling  an  operation  as  logistically

 complex  as  the  Kuwaiti  Invasion,  there  is reason to believe Makashov,

 and/or  other  Russian  commanders,   oversaw   the   Invasion.   This   is

 substantiated by the fact that there were Soviet military advisers attached

 to  the  Iraqi  helicopter,  tank,  logistic,  and radar units used for the

 Invasion of Kuwait (55).  Also,  1200 Iraqi military personnel  were  being

 trained  by Soviet specialists at Odessa,  inside the Soviet Union,  around

 the time of the Invasion (56).  Further evidence of Moscow's complicity  in

 the  Invasion  stems  from  the  fact  that the Soviets sold or transferred

 military spare parts to Saddam for at least five days following the  August

 2nd  Invasion  (57).  What's  more,  when the U.S.  began surveillance over

 Kuwait in the wake of the Invasion,  there  were  indications  that  Soviet

 technicians  helped  the Iraqi air force jam intelligence and eavesdropping

 on flights by American aircraft (58).

     There  was  also  strong  evidence  of  Soviet  complicity  with   Iraq

 throughout the Gulf War.  On numerous occasions allied forces heard Russian

 language   communiques  on  Iraqi  military  radios.   Following  the  War,

 returning U.S.  soldiers said they saw evidence in the  field  that  Soviet

 advisers  were  working  along  with  Iraqi  forces.  According to F.  Andy

 Messing,  executive director of the National  Defense  Council  Foundation,

 there  were  over two dozen documented cases that showed Soviet involvement

 in Iraq during the Gulf War. "The Soviets were all over the place", Messing

 reported,  Soviet advisers "continued to tune radars,  fix tanks and planes

 and  advise (Iraqi) combat units down to the battalion level".  In a Senate

 Foreign Relations briefing paper published  February  21st,  1991,  it  was

 reported that:  "For two days in February, Russian language and voices were

 communicating over  Iraqi  military  networks".  Furthermore,  the  Soviets

 repositioned  satellites over the Gulf region and were "supplying targeting

 information to  the  Iraqis  for  mobile  missile  launchers".  The  report

 outlined  how  Soviet  advisers  were "helping Iraqis fire SCUD missiles at

 Israel and Saudi Arabia".  On February 25th,  two days after the ground war

 began,  former  Defense  Secretary  Caspar  Weinberger  said  during  a BBC

 interview that the Soviet Union was still supplying arms to  Iraq.  Despite

 the   strong  evidence  of  Soviet  complicity,   the  Kremlin  denied  any

 involvement with Iraq and assured the West that its advisers and  personnel

 were pulled out soon after Iraq invaded Kuwait. (59)

     All in all, there appears to be sufficient indirect and direct evidence

 to  believe that the Persian Gulf Crisis was a Soviet-engineered deception.

 The  inconsistencies  and  contradictions  in  Iraqi  and  Soviet  behavior

 throughout  the  Gulf  Crisis  build  a  strong  circumstantial  case for a

 deception in the Gulf.  Based upon the direct evidence above,  there  seems

 little  doubt  that  the  Soviets  were  both  aware of and involved in the

 Invasion  of  Kuwait.   Furthermore,   it  is  clear   that   the   Soviets

 underhandedly  backed  the  Iraqis  throughout  the  Gulf War.  The logical

 explanation  for  the  directly  incriminating   evidence   is   that   the

 circumstantial  case  is  correct.  Moscow  and  Baghdad worked together to

 create a large-scale deception in the Persian Gulf.


           Undoubtedly,  Western  intelligence  had some idea of Soviet

       involvement in the Gulf.  However,  their interpretation of  the

       connection  was  most  likely  misled.  Backed-up  by reassuring

       Soviet excuses,  Western analysts would downplay the  importance

       and implications of any Soviet involvement.  This is because the

       West would either have to accept that Saddam was a fool and they

       were winning or they were the fools and would end up losing in a

       most  tragic  way.  Western  arrogance  and fear would take over

       from there, something the Soviets could count on. (60)

                           -Part IV:  The Strategy-

           Why would Moscow have had Iraq stage the Gulf  War  and  its

       own  defeat?  Why would have Saddam Hussein gone along with such

       a humiliating plan?  Because the Gulf Crisis may have served  as

       an  important  deception  to  set  the  stage  for  a successful

       surprise attack by the East  against  the  West  and,  in  turn,

       totalitarian  domination  of the world.  Because Saddam Hussein,

       as a reward for his current sacrifices,  may eventually  receive

       the  power  to  're-create  the  glories  that  were Babylon and

       Mesopotamia' and then have  dominion  over  them.  By  accepting

       defeat  in the "Mother of All 'Battles'",  Saddam may have paved

       the way for totalitarianism to win the Mother of All 'Wars':

                                World War III.

     As a deception,  the Gulf Crisis would have served  important  military

 and political strategic aims of Moscow and its Eastern counterparts.

     In that it is not popularly perceived or expected,  Russia,  in concert

 with other military powers of the East,  may be pursuing a  grand  strategy

 for  world  domination  which involves launching a surprise third world war

 against the West (61).  The central idea of any such strategy would  be  to

 instill  a  false  sense  of  security  in the West.  Such a false sense of

 security will minimimize the West's military potential and maximize Western

 vulnerability.  This is true for two  main  reasons.  First  off,  with  no

 sense  of  a  threat,  the  West  will  reduce  its  military preparedness.

 Secondly, upon attack, the East would have the advantage of surprise- a key

 ingredient to success in a war involving rapid mass destruction.

     The principal way in which Moscow may be  trying  to  instill  a  false

 sense  of  security  in  the West is deceit.  By intentionally creating and

 exaggerating the image of weakness and incapacitation,  along with pursuing

 cooperative,  peace-oriented policies favorable to the West,  the perceived

 Soviet military threat has been virtually eliminated,  America has come  to

 trust its long-time Russian foe, and Western arrogance has been inflated to

 blinding proportions.  Consequently,  a tremendous, potentially false sense

 of  security  has  developed  in  the  West  entailing  a  high  degree  of


     If,  indeed,  the Gulf crisis was a deception,  then it was tailor-made

 for a strategy  as  outlined  above.  First  off,  by  creating  a  serious

 international  crisis  in  which  critical Western interests were at stake,

 Moscow gave itself the opportunity to cooperate with the West in  a  manner

 that seemed to reflect a progressive, peace-oriented change of heart.  This

 significantly fostered Western trust.  Secondly, since the West was allowed

 such  a substantial victory over Iraq,  and because Saddam's military state

 was of Soviet-design,  the West's sense of  superiority  to  the  East  was

 significantly  inflated  by  the  Gulf  War,  particularly  with respect to

 military capabilities (62).  Third,  since Moscow  turned  its  back  on  a

 valuable  military  ally  during the Gulf Crisis,  the image that Russia is

 incapacitated and  increasingly  interested  in  peaceful  coexistence  was

 reinforced and exagerrated.  Lastly,  on a broader level, the isolation and

 utter military defeat of Saddam Hussein's Iraq served as a symbolic end  to

 the power of military totalitarian regimes.

     A  provocative  example  of  how  Western  trust may have been directly

 exploited by the Soviets for successfully waging a surprise third world war

 can be seen in interrelated developments surrounding the  Gulf  Crisis  and

 the  Conventional  Forces  in  Europe  (CFE)  treaty.  In November of 1990,

 during the middle of the Gulf Crisis,  the United  States  signed  the  CFE

 treaty  with the Soviet Union.  The treaty entails major reductions in both

 sides' European theatre conventional forces into 1994.

     The CFE treaty is highly favorable to the Soviets  in  the  context  of

 their  initiating  a  third  world war with a preemptive,  nuclear surprise

 attack against the West.  The reason this is so has to  do  with  the  fact

 that  the  United  States  is  an  ocean  away from the European continent,

 whereas the Soviet Union is directly attached to  it.  Following  a  Soviet

 nuclear  attack,  America  would be unable to reinforce its European allies

 because the necessary ports,  airfields,  men and equipment will have  been

 destroyed.  Consequently,  it  would  be  relatively  easy  for  Russia  to

 reorganize the Soviet army and march across Western Europe (63).  Thus, the

 U.S.  force withdrawals under the CFE treaty may be benefitting Russia  if,

 indeed, a nuclear surprise attack is being planned.

     The Gulf Crisis sped-up and augmented the U.S.  pullout from Europe.  A

 substantial portion of the half-million  soldiers  and  military  equipment

 that  poured  into  Saudi Arabia for the Gulf War was pulled out of Western

 Europe (64).  For instance,  half  of  America's  mechanized  divisions  in

 Europe  were  drawn  into  the Gulf.  From Germany alone,  more than 70,000

 soldiers and 40,000 tanks, artillery pieces, and other equipment were moved

 to Saudi Arabia  (65).  Following  the  Gulf  War,  with  superpower  trust

 elevated,  many  of  the  forces pulled from Western Europe returned to the

 U.S.  rather than the European theatre because it was to be removed by 1994

 under the terms of the CFE treaty anyways (66).

     The Gulf Crisis,  along with technicalities in the CFE treaty, was used

 by the Soviets to stockpile military equipment behind the  Ural  mountains-

 an important preparatory measure prior to waging a surprise attack- without

 alarming the West.  Just before signing the CFE agreement during the middle

 of  the  Gulf  Crisis,  the Soviets scurried over 70,000 pieces of military

 equipment east of the Ural mountains (according to  Moscow's  count)  (67).

 On  top  of  a  large  number of planes,  helicopters,  and armoured combat

 vehicles,  20,000 tanks and over 34,000 artillery pieces were  moved.  This

 accounts for half the tanks and two-thirds of the artillery the Soviets had

 prepositioned  against  Western  Europe  up  to  that  time.   Placing  the

 equipment behind the Urals protects it from being  counted  under  the  CFE

 treaty limits.  It also protects it from Western missile and/or air attacks

 and  puts  the  equipment  in  a  strategic position for later use in a re-

 conquest of Eastern Europe and offensive on Western Europe.  In a Februaury

 opposing-editorial to the Wall Street Journal,  the Deputy Director of  the

 Arms  Control  Association,  Jack Mendelsohn,  commented that:  "...placing

 these weapons in storage behind the Urals says  something  important  about

 Soviet  intentions  regarding  a  surprise attack or general war in Europe"

 (68).  NATO's supreme commander (retired:  6/92), General John Galvin,  had

 this  to  say  about  the stockpile:  "My concern is that this equipment is

 there for future use.  It's big, big numbers.  But I know it's just sitting

 there in the  snow-  tanks  and  airplanes  side  by  side,  sometimes  for

 kilometers  at  a  time"  (69).  For  the  most  part,  however,  the  West

 disregarded the provocative Soviet move.  Western suspicions were minimized

 due to growing superpower trust,  the distracting events in the  Gulf,  and

 the  idea  that  the Soviets may have simply been seeking to circumvent the

 CFE treaty.

     As can be readily surmised,  the general idea of the  Gulf  Crisis  and

 Moscow's  strategy  in  general  may involve seducing the West with lies in

 order to successfully wage a surprise third  world  war.  It  may  be  that

 Gorbachev  and  Saddam  are seeking to achieve long-run victory by allowing

 their own short-run defeats.  The West seems to have been easily seduced by

 what may prove to be the staged death of Eastern  military  totalitarianism

 and  an  illusory  global victory of Western society.  Such a lie is simply

 too tempting for indulgent,  proud Westerners to refuse.  As a  consequence

 of  this,  Western  vulnerability is at a post-war extreme and its military

 potential has been significantly compromised.  Thus, the path may have been

 opened for an all-out surprise attack from the East.


     Summarily,  there is substantial reason to believe the Gulf Crisis  was

 not  what it appeared to be.  In fact,  it may have been the total opposite

 of what it seemed- a total lie.  Instead of being  a  'great  victory',  as

 General Schwarzkopf believes,  the Gulf War may have been a deception which

 is being used toward the utter defeat of the West  and  global  victory  of

 Eastern totalitarianism.

     A   logical   explanation   for   the   pervasive  inconsistencies  and

 contradictions in Iraqi and Soviet behavior throughout the Gulf Crisis  and

 Gulf  War  is  that  the  whole  affair  may  have been some sort of staged

 deception.  It is possible that Saddam invaded Kuwait under  Kremlin  order

 with  the  sole intention of provoking a war with the West.  By cooperating

 with the West in an unprecedented manner,  the Soviets opened the  way  for

 the  Gulf War.  Once war came,  Saddam did what it took to decisively lose.

 The upshot is that Moscow and Baghdad underhandedly worked together to hand

 the West an illusory Gulf victory.

     The purpose behind such a deception would  likely  involve  an  overall

 Eastern  strategy  to  dominate  the  world by fighting and winning a third

 world war.  Saddam stomached a humiliating defeat in  order  to  augment  a

 false  sense  of security in the West and help Soviet Russia completely win

 over Western trust.  This,  in turn,  has opened the way for Moscow to dupe

 the West into lowering its guard, thus creating an opportunity for the East

 to launch a successful surprise attack.

     Due  in  large  part to the Gulf Crisis,  the world may today be on the

 brink of what would undoubtedly be the  the  Mother  of  All  Wars.  It  is

 rather  apparent  that  an  attack  from  the  East  would today be a total

 surprise.  Furthermore,  in the wake of its  Gulf  'victory',  America  has

 increasingly  let  down its military guard,  particularly against a Russian

 nuclear  attack.  {For  instance,  America's  strategic  command  has  been

 disbanded,  a  sizable part of the U.S.  ICBM arsenal has been deactivated,

 many attack-warning satellites and radar installations have been  shutdown,

 and almost all U.S.  tactical nuclear weapons abroad have been pulled home-

 including those which were on naval vessels (70).} All in all,  the  proper

 conditions  have  developed  for  the  East to launch a successful surprise

 attack against the West.  The Persian Gulf Crisis may have been a seductive

 lie which was created toward this ultimate End.

           "The harvest in the Mother of Battles  has  succeeded...

      the greater harvest and its yield will be in the time to come..."

              {comment by Saddam Hussein following the Gulf War}


        (Notes and References to this paper are in the next document.)