From: landlord@telerama.lm.com (Mayor Loz) Newsgroups: alt.conspiracy Subject: CFR Admits To "NEEDING Saddaam" Date: Tue, 02 Dec 1997 16:05:58 GMT Message-ID: <3484317f.7382007@news.lm.com> Our Man in Baghdad by William F. Jasper That old Satan, Saddam Hussein. Once again, as if on cue, he has been trotted out to boost the global military and diplomatic agenda of the new world order. This time Saddam has earned the condemnation of the "world community" for threatening to shoot down American U-2 reconnaissance planes and refusing to allow U.S. members of the United Nations inspection teams onto suspected chemical and biological weapons sites. A more useful and dependable demon for America's foreign policy establishment, epitomized by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), would be difficult to invent. But invent him "we" have, says CFR double-dome Fareed Zakaria. In an essay published in the September 16, 1996 issue of Newsweek, two weeks after President Clinton's cruise missile attack on Iraq, Zakaria challenged critics who saw in Saddam's continued brutal reign a "failure of diplomacy in the Middle East." According to Zakaria, managing editor of the CFR's flagship journal Foreign Affairs, "Nothing could be further from the truth. If Saddam Hussein did not exist, we would have to invent him. He is the linchpin of American policy in the Mideast." (Emphasis added.) Necessary Evil Saddam the "linchpin of American policy"? That's right. Just when you think it is as good as holy writ that Mr. Hussein is "another Hitler," "the Butcher of Baghdad," "a global menace," etc., you find out that he is essential to our foreign policy. Then why the nonstop, seven-year vilification of the Iraqi despot by George Bush, Bill Clinton, Dick Cheney, Brent Scowcroft, Madeleine Albright, and the rest of the CFR foreign policy elite? That's easy. If you're going to rally public support behind a massive, costly, perpetual U.S. military presence on the other side of the planet, all that incendiary blather about Saddam as Satan is indispensable. But the great unwashed who will be called upon to sacrifice blood and treasure for this worthy crusade must be made to understand that though Hussein is evil, he is a necessary evil. Why is this? Because, as Mr. Zakaria explains, "the end of Saddam Hussein would be the end of the anti-Saddam coalition. Nothing destroys an alliance like the disappearance of the enemy." Saddam, you see, is merely the means to an end; that end is a global military/political alliance under the aegis of the United Nations. If Saddam were to disappear, other convincing enemies would have to be invented by the one-world advocates to justify the far-flung deployment of American military muscle in service of the United Nations and global government. But each new "crisis" precipitated by Hussein's threats or actions raises again those troubling questions among the uneducated American booboisie who just don't get the "complex nuances" of American foreign policy. Why didn't we finish off Hussein at Desert Storm? Why didn't we at least disarm or destroy his Republican Guard, the mainstay of his power, when we had the opportunity? "Had the United States 'finished the job' … it would first have had the unenviable task of governing — or being responsible for — Iraq, with its Kurdish rebellion in the North and its Shiite rebellion in the South," answers Zakaria. "Saddam is able to manage this because he is a rapacious dictator who runs a police state." This same "stability" argument was presented by Brent Scowcroft (CFR) in a September 23, 1996 Newsweek op-ed. According to Scowcroft, a national security adviser under Presidents Reagan and Bush, "we never had the objective of destroying Saddam's regime during Desert Storm." In fact, he asserted, "had we continued the war and overthrown Saddam, we might be worse off today." Parroting Zakaria's false options, Scowcroft claimed that "if we had succeeded in overthrowing Saddam, we would have confronted a choice between occupying Iraq with thousands of American troops for the indefinite future and creating a power vacuum in the Persian Gulf for Iran to fill." "Put simply," said Scowcroft, "getting rid of Saddam would not solve our problems, or even necessarily serve our interests." Globalist Designs When CFR savants like Scowcroft talk about "our problems" and "our interests," it is dangerous to suppose that they are referring to genuine American problems and American interests. They are referring, of course, to their "problems" — obstacles that stand in the way of their globalist designs. And a major feature of those designs is a permanent U.S./UN military force in the Gulf capable of enforcing UN mandates. As early as August 9, 1990 the Wall Street Journal, that venerable business voice of the CFR one-worlders, was opining on the need for "setting up permanent protection of the world's oil sources around the Persian Gulf." This was seconded weeks later by Robert W. Tucker (CFR) in Insight magazine, with the declaration that "the only possible solution is a permanent American military presence in the region." On August 20, 1990, Foreign Affairs associate editor Warren Getler (CFR) took to the pages of the Wall Street Journal to go still further, insisting that the UN must be able to "operate independently" of the U.S. by commanding its own army — "one capable of not just peacekeeping but enforcement." So it has gone for the past seven years, with the CFR's stable of pundits, "policy experts," and talking heads providing nonstop propaganda for a perpetual deployment of U.S. forces to serve as UN janissaries of the new world order. The latest major variation on this theme came in the form of an ensemble sonata by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Murphy (CFR all) in the May/June 1997 issue of Foreign Affairs. Entitled "Differentiated Containment," this significant statement of CFR Insider policy might seem, at first glance, to contradict the aforementioned Zakaria- Scowcroft thesis. "The continued rule of Saddam Hussein poses a danger to the stability and security of the region," assert the CFR triumvirate. So what should the U.S. do? Simple: "America's basic goal should continue to be keeping Saddam's Iraq in a straightjacket," while adjusting "the fit to ensure the straightjacket holds." "Differentiated Approach" "It is imperative that all parties understand an important strategic reality: the United States is in the Persian Gulf to stay," say Brzezinski and company. "The security and independence of the region is a vital U.S. interest." They write that a "more nuanced and differentiated approach to the region is in order, one in tune with America's longer-term interests." And what, pray tell, is that "nuanced and differentiated approach"? A major component involves new overtures to Iran, something President Clinton (CFR) has already been pursuing. "Toughened U.S. sanctions against Iran, although doing some damage to the Iranian economy, have produced no major achievements and increasingly isolate America rather than their target." If this good-terrorist-state-versus-bad-terrorist-state motif sounds sickeningly familiar, there's good reason: It is the same rotten refrain that has accompanied the deadly good-communist- versus-bad-communist arrangements played by the CFR hands at the State Department for the last 50 years. But then get this. "The strident U.S. campaign to isolate Iran," say Brzezinski, Scowcroft, and Murphy, "drives Iran and Russia together…." And why is that bad? After all, is Russia not our great "Gulf ally"? This "Russia card" is especially rich coming from Brzezinski, who played such a key role in helping President Carter destabilize the entire Gulf region by overthrowing the most solidly pro-Western, anti-communist, and genuinely progressive government in that part of the world — the government of the Shah of Iran. Comrade Zbig (who wrote in Between Two Ages that "Marxism represents a further vital and creative stage in the maturing of man's universal vision") pushed Iran directly into Moscow's arms when he put Khomeini on the Peacock Throne. Scowcroft's contribution is no less rich, particularly considering the pivotal role he played — as a partner in Kissinger Associates and as National Security Adviser to George Bush — in the massive transfers of military technologies and foreign aid to Saddam Hussein during the 1980s. During the Reagan-Bush years, Iraq became Washington's second biggest trading partner in the Arab world. Billions of dollars in loan guarantees, subsidized grains, and weapons-related exports were showered upon Saddam, who was to be "our" thug in the CFR balance-of-power scheming in the Mideast, despite his long record as a Soviet client state and a sponsor of terrorists. Cluster bombs, munitions, highly sensitive nuclear weapons technology — these and much more were made available to Saddam. And, as Peter Mantius notes in his 1995 book Shell Game, "No top advisers to Bush backed the Iraq strategy more doggedly than Scowcroft and [former Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence] Eagleburger." Green Light From Bush So blatant was the Bush tilt toward Hussein that even Newsweek felt compelled to remark in its October 1, 1990 issue: "It seems incredible, given his post-invasion comparisons of the Iraqi dictator to Hitler, but as recently as last July, George Bush regarded Saddam as a potential force for stability in the Middle East." In fact, said Newsweek, "it can be argued, Saddam was given a green light to gobble up his oil-rich neighbor." While the Bush Administration was telling Saddam (through U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie) that "we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait," Mikhail Gorbachev was sending one of the Soviet Union's most famous tactical commanders, General Albert Makashov, to Iraq to plan the invasion of Kuwait. When Makashov arrived in Baghdad on July 17, 1990, two weeks before the invasion, he joined about 8,000 Soviet military advisers and technicians who were already in place providing expertise and maintenance for Soviet-supplied fighter aircraft, Scud missile guidance systems, helicopters, radar, communications, antiaircraft defenses, tank units — in short, virtually the entire military machine of the evil Saddam Hussein. As top Soviet defector Anatoliy Golitsyn observed at the time, the huge Soviet military presence, the arrival of Makashov, the visit to Iraq by Yevgeny Primakov, and the visit to Moscow by Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, all indicated Soviet connivance and participation in the invasion of Kuwait. But President Bush, pretending not to notice General Makashov and the massive Soviet military contingent in Iraq, did not even ask our "good friend" Gorbachev to remove his troops as a quid pro quo for the billions in aid the U.S. was pledging to our new- found Russian ally. During an interview published in the October 3, 1990 issue of the Soviet magazine Literaturnaya Gazeta, Yevgeny Primakov, the Kremlin's top Middle East expert and a member of Mikhail Gorbachev's presidential council, asserted: "However dangerous the Gulf crisis may be in itself … I think we should proceed from the fact that it offers a kind of laboratory, testing out efforts to create a new world order after the Cold War." And what an interesting laboratory it was — and still remains! For one thing, it is a military intelligence gold mine for the Soviets, enabling them to collect and evaluate enormous amounts of invaluable information on U.S. weapons systems, tactics and force deployment, and supply procedures. And Primakov, who went on to head the Foreign Intelligence Service of the "reformed" KGB, is now, of course, foreign minister for Boris Yeltsin and the "hero" who has brought Saddam back to the negotiating table. He is able to do that, naturally, because Moscow is still Saddam's arsenal. It is also, together with Beijing (another Gulf "partner"), the main arms supplier to Saddam's nemesis, Iran. Weakened Defense The tremendous expenditure of U.S. military and economic assets in the Gulf during Desert Storm and in the years since, along with major draw-downs, have dramatically weakened the U.S. Armed Forces. Since our "victory" against Saddam in 1991, U.S. taxpayers have shoveled out tens of billions of dollars a year in military deployment costs and bribes to keep the UN's fictional "Gulf coalition" together. Prior to the latest round of "Gulf Chicken," the USS Nimitz carrier group of 17 ships, 60 tactical aircraft, and 12,500 sailors and marines was stationed in the area. It was augmented with a U.S. Air Force contingent of 120 aircraft and 6,000 personnel stationed in Saudi Arabia, and over 1,000 Army troops in Kuwait. President Clinton's current muscle-flexing has resulted in the dispatch of the USS George Washington carrier group to the region with five ships, 54 tactical aircraft, and 7,400 sailors and marines, together with an Air Force group of six B-52 bombers, nine KC-10s and six F-117 Stealth fighters, and an unspecified number of Air Force personnel. Instead of protecting America's shores and American lives and property, these American men and vital American military assets are being squandered to "straitjacket" an invented enemy and enforce the edicts of the one-world poohbahs at the United Nations. n THE NEW AMERICAN - Copyright 1997, American Opinion Publishing, Incorporated P.O. Box 8040, Appleton, WI 54913 Homepage: http://www.jbs.org/tna.htm Subscriptions: $39.00/year (26 issues) - 1-800-727-TRUE WRITTEN PERMISSION FOR REPOSTING REQUIRED: Released for informational purposes to allow individual file transfer, Usenet, and non-commercial mail-list posting only. 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